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REMEDYING SOCIETAL DISCRIMINATION
THROUGH THE SPENDING POWER
MICHAEL SELMI*
The Supreme Court has long restricted governments' ability to
remedy societal discrimination, and this restriction has sharply
limited affirmative action efforts in many diverse contexts. In this
article, Professor Selmi crafts an argument that would allow
governments to justify affirmative action efforts based on a desire
to remedy societal discrimination. Professor Selmi builds his
argument on a series of cases where the Court has shown great
deference to government spending initiatives, such as in the context
of federally funded health clinics, government-sponsored art, and
highway funds. Under this line of cases, government programs
that are tied to the spending power are adjudicated under a
rational basis test, a test, Professor Selmi argues, that should
permit efforts to remedy societal discrimination.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's affirmative action jurisprudence poses a
central dilemma: most governmental programs are intended to
remedy societal discrimination, while the Supreme Court has
consistently held that a desire to remedy societal discrimination
provides a constitutionally inadequate basis for race-conscious
affirmative action plans.' Stated somewhat differently, most
governmental affirmative action is intended to remedy someone else's
discrimination, but the Court will only allow governments to use race-
conscious means to remedy their own discrimination 2 Consider, for
1. I will discuss the cases in detail in Part I.A, infra, but the leading cases are Shaw v.
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (redistricting); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469 (1989) (set-asides); Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986)
(employment); and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(education affirmative action).
2. The Supreme Court has left some theoretical space for governments to remedy
private discrimination. See Ian Ayres & Frederick E. Vars, When Does Private
Discrimination Justify Public Affirmative Action?, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1577, 1585 (1998)
(arguing that under certain circumstances the government can seek to remedy private
discrimination). Lower courts, however, have generally interpreted Supreme Court
doctrine to require proof of identified discrimination, committed or participated in by the
government before approving affirmative action plans. See, e.g., W.H. Scott Constr. Co. v.
City of Jackson, 199 F.3d 206, 219 (5th Cir. 2000) (requiring "particularized findings of
discrimination within its various agencies"); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 171 (1st
Cir. 1996) (stating that "voluntary affirmative action plans cannot be constitutionally
justified absent a particularized factual predicate demonstrating the existence of
'identified discrimination' "); Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 91 F.3d 586, 596
(3d Cir. 1996) (concluding that "race-based preferences cannot be justified by reference to
past 'societal' discrimination in which the municipality played no material role");
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example, the recent case involving the University of Michigan Law
School. In that case, the law school defended its affirmative action
policy as necessary to remedy societal disadvantages faced by
minority applicants rather than as a result of the school's own
discrimination, a justification the district court found inadequate to
support the program.3  Contract set-aside programs instituted by
many governments are likewise predicated on the need to remedy
discrimination within a particular industry, as opposed to
discrimination perpetrated by the government itself.4
The inability of governments to remedy societal discrimination
has sharply limited the efficacy of affirmative action programs.
Lacking the power to remedy societal discrimination, a wide range of
governmental affirmative action programs have been invalidated,
including dozens of contract set-asides and educational programs
from elementary schools to universities.5 It is not too much to suggest
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 950 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he state's use of remedial racial
classifications is limited to the harm caused by a specific state actor.").
3. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 869 (E.D. Mich. 2001). The district
court explained:
In the present case there has been no evidence, or even an allegation, that the
law school or the University of Michigan has engaged in racial discrimination.
All of the evidence submitted by the intervenors relates to discrimination on the
part of society at large or by entities other than the law school or the University
of Michigan. As a matter of federal constitutional law, the law school ... may
not consider the race of applicants in order to compensate for the effects of
discrimination by others or by society generally.
Id. At about the same time that the district court struck down the law school's policy, a
different district court upheld the University's affirmative action plan as a constitutional
means of achieving diversity, and it will be left to the Sixth Circuit to sort out the two
cases. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 831 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
4. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730,740 (6th Cir. 2000)
(invalidating Ohio's set-aside program because it was not designed to remedy
governmental discrimination), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1148 (2001); Monterey Mech. Co. v.
Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 714 (9th Cir. 1997) (invalidating a California university's set-aside
program based on a lack of identified discrimination).
5. In addition to the cases listed in supra note 4, see Eng'g Contractors Ass'n v.
Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 929 (11th Cir. 1997) (invalidating Dade County's
contract program); Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 91 F.3d 586, 609-10 (6th Cir.
1996) (invalidating Philadelphia's contract set-aside program as based on insufficient
evidence); Ass'n for Fairness in Bus., Inc. v. New Jersey, 82 F. Supp. 2d 353, 354 (D.N.J.
2000) (granting a preliminary injunction against a state set-aside program). For cases
invalidating education affirmative action plans at all levels, see Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at
869 (striking down the University of Michigan law school plan in part because the plan
rested on societal discrimination); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234, 1237 (11th
Cir. 2001) (invalidating the University of Georgia's affirmative action plan); Eisenberg v.
Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 133 (4th Cir. 1999) (invalidating a public
school plan), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1019 (2000); Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 792 (1st
Cir. 1998) (invalidating a Boston school district racial balancing plan), cert. dismissed, 529
U.S. 1050 (2000); Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1549-50 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc)
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that most, if not all, of these cases would have come out differently if
governments had the power to remedy societal discrimination. Yet,
given the central role the question of societal discrimination has
played in the Court's doctrine, scholars have devoted surprisingly
little attention to the issue; rather, the Court's prohibition on
remedying societal discrimination has generally been accepted
without significant challenge.6
In this Article, I want to pose a challenge by arguing that the
Court is wrong when it states that governments cannot seek to
remedy societal discrimination. On the contrary, I contend that the
government has the power to remedy societal discrimination through
its spending power, a power that has not previously been applied to
affirmative action programs even though such programs seek to shape
behavior through the distribution of federal funds.7 I base my
argument on a series of cases that are not generally linked to
governmental race-conscious affirmative action programs. These
cases have held in a variety of contexts that the government is
constitutionally permitted to pursue legitimate political and social
(invalidating the use of affirmative action in layoff determination); Hopwood, 78 F.3d at
934 (invalidating the use of race in an admissions program for the University of Texas);
Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 1994) (invalidating the University of
Maryland's racially specific scholarships).
6. Many commentators have acknowledged the importance of the limitation but
typically do so without much further discussion. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for
Race Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1096 (1991) ("Affirmative action programs
... may not attempt to remedy the effects of past and present 'societal discrimination.' ");
Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88
GEo. L.J. 2331, 2341-42 (2000) ("Perhaps the greatest difficulty for affirmative action ...
is the Supreme Court's rejection of 'societal discrimination' as a justification for racial
classifications."); Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness & Difference in Twentieth
Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1923, 2013 (2000) ("The Court has been adamant ...
that the remedy of mere 'societal discrimination' is not a compelling state interest that
justifies voluntary affirmative action programs."); Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative
Action, Diversity and the Black Middle Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939, 941 (1997)
("Anyone who has read the Supreme Court cases knows that the Court does not accept
the remedying of past or present societal discrimination as an acceptable justification for
affirmative action."); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111, 1143 (1997)
(noting that the prohibition on remedying societal discrimination has severely
"constrain[ed] legislatures from adopting policies designed to reduce race and gender
stratification").
7. See infra Part II.B. Professor Abner Greene has recently argued that the
government should use its means to pursue what the government chooses to define as the
"good," rather than remaining neutral on important social and economic questions. See
Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1, 2 (2000). I agree with
much of his argument but will for the most part eschew normative claims, though they will
often be implicit-and sometimes explicit-in my argument.
SOCIETAL DISCRIMINATION
ends through its spending power, and that the government can attain
some ends indirectly through its spending power that it could not
accomplish directly.' For example, the government has used its
spending power to prohibit federal contractors from discussing
abortion while working at federally-funded health clinics,9 to ensure
that federal funds are not used to support indecent art,10 and to
achieve a national speed limit" as well as a national drinking age.12 If
the government can use its spending power to achieve these political
and often controversial goals, then the government should be
permitted to use its spending power to eradicate discrimination,
including discrimination that is the product of society generally rather
than attributable to a particular actor.
The natural rejoinder to this argument is that "race is
different, ' 13 but as I will demonstrate, constitutionally speaking race
is more similar to abortion or even funding for the arts than it is
different. After all, abortion is a fundamental right subject to the
Court's strict scrutiny, 4 the same legal scrutiny that applies to matters
involving race. To the extent that programs seeking to discourage
abortions are subject to deferential review when those programs are
tied to the spending power, racially-motivated programs intended to
remedy societal discrimination should receive the same level of
scrutiny.' Applying the deferential standard of review that attaches
to government funding initiatives to affirmative action programs
should lead to upholding plans that would otherwise be invalidated.
8. See, e.g., NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587-88 (1998) (upholding a federal statute
limiting the scope of the NEA's authority to issue grants to artists against First
Amendment objections); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (affirming the
constitutionality of regulations disallowing the use of federal funds for abortion-related
family planning); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (upholding a federal
statute tying federal highway funds to a state's adoption of a drinking age of twenty-one);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (holding that a state need not fund medically
necessary abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1977) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause does not require states participating in the Medicaid program to pay for
nontherapeutic abortions for indigent women). These and other cases are discussed in
detail in Part II, infra.
9. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 203.
10. Finley, 524 U.S. at 572-73.
11. Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445,454 (9th Cir. 1989).
12. Dole, 483 U.S. at 212.
13. See Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight,
69 TEx. L. REv. 125, 155 (1990) (arguing that "[r]ace is different" from other
congressional programs such as farm supports); Christopher Edley, Jr., Color at Century's
End: Race in Law, Policy, and Politics, 67 FoRDHAM L. REV. 939, 948 (1998) (contending
that "race is different" when it comes to forms of affirmative action).
14. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,851-53 (1992).
15. See infra, Part III.A.
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Government might, and does, employ a variety of means to
remedy societal discrimination, including promoting diversity through
its contracting programs, promoting racial integration in housing or
education, and other racially motivated, but not race conscious
efforts. I specifically suggest that existing government contract set-
aside programs should be reconfigured so that the government would
provide preferences to contractors based on the diversity of their
workforces, rather than, as is currently the case, on the race or
ethnicity of the ownership. 6 Restructured in this fashion, the
contracting programs can be seen as implementing a governmental
policy preference for doing business with companies that have
exemplary hiring records-records that help redress the persistence
of societal discrimination. 7 In this respect, the programs would be
largely indistinguishable from those designed to discourage abortions
or to encourage decent art, given that they would be designed to
pursue a particular political end.
In addition to reconfiguring the set-aside programs to bring them
within the permissible scope of the government's spending power, I
will also demonstrate that the government already indirectly works to
remedy societal discrimination through Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,18 which requires federal contractors to refrain from racial
16. See infra, Part III.B.
17. Although my focus will largely be on federal programs because that is how the
doctrine regarding the funding cases has largely developed, my argument should apply
with equal force to local and state efforts aimed at remedying societal discrimination. As
discussed in Part I.A, the Supreme Court applies the same level of review to federal and
state affirmative action programs, see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
235 (1995), and the Court has likewise acknowledged the state's ability to use its spending
power to further its chosen objectives, see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469,492 (1989). There is some possibility that a federal program would be upheld under a
less strict form of review than might apply to state programs, largely as a result of the
federal government's remedial powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently upheld a federal set-aside
program based on a form of strict scrutiny whereas no state or local program has yet
survived a court's strict review, a decision the Supreme Court recently agreed to review.
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1155 (10th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, 512 U.S. 1288 (2001). The Supreme Court, however, recently has significantly
restricted the government's Section 5 remedial power. See Robert C. Post & Reva B.
Siegel, Equal Protection By Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison
and Kimel, 110 YALE LJ. 441, 442 (2001). Whether the Court will permit a broader realm
of federal efforts than it would accept for state or local programs remains to be seen, but
my argument does not turn on the federal government's Section 5 powers, and therefore
will apply to all governmental efforts to remedy societal discrimination.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) (Title VI). The federal government also prohibits sex
discrimination in education among entities receiving federal financial assistance. See 20
U.S.C. § 1681 (1994). There are a number of similarities between Title VI and Title IX,
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discrimination and has been construed to reach neutral practices that
have adverse racial effects.19 Disparate impact claims, as these claims
are known, are intended primarily to remedy societal discrimination,
and I suggest that Title VI can be interpreted through the
government's spending power to require the recipients of federal
funds to take actions to eliminate the adverse impact of their practices
both as a means of remedying societal discrimination and as a
condition for receiving those funds. Under this theory, the
government can require more of its fund recipients than the
Constitution requires,20 and it can do so with the express purpose of
remedying societal discrimination, despite the Supreme Court's
frequent proclamations to the contrary.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the Court's
current doctrine relating to remedying societal discrimination.2' In
this section, I trace the history of the Court's treatment of societal
discrimination, and also indicate how the Court has often vacillated in
its approach, even while it has held steadfast to the notion that the
government cannot use affirmative action to remedy societal
discrimination. In addition, I demonstrate that the standard of review
the Court applies to the cases proves critical to the validity of
affirmative action plans intended to remedy societal discrimination-
programs analyzed under strict scrutiny are invariably invalidated
while programs analyzed under a lesser form of review are upheld.
Given that the Court has never defined the term societal
discrimination, I also define the concept and by doing so emphasize
the government's responsibility to address societal discrimination,
which is properly seen as involving the cumulative effects of multiple
acts, many of which are attributable to the government. In Part II, I
craft my argument based on the government funding cases,
contending that these cases provide the proper analytical framework
for reviewing governmental efforts to remedy societal
discrimination-a framework that relies on rationality review rather
than strict scrutiny.22 In Part III, I discuss what that doctrine means
but in this Article I concentrate on race discrimination, for that is the context in which the
Court's doctrine relating to societal discrimination has been principally developed.
19. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,293-94 (1985).
20. By virtue of a long-standing executive order, the Department of Labor requires
federal contractors who receive federal contracts that exceed $50,000 to engage in limited
affirmative action efforts. See Obligations of Contractors and Subcontractors, 41 C.F.R.
§ 60-1.40 (2001).
21. See infra notes 24-146 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 147-238 and accompanying text.
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for the government's efforts to address societal discrimination.P In
particular, I propose ways in which the existing contract set-aside
programs can be reconfigured to focus on the diversity of a firm's
workforce rather than its ownership, so that the programs will be
reviewed under scrutiny derived from the government funding
cases-and survive.
I. UNDERSTANDING SOCIETAL DISCRIMINATION
In this section, I explore the Court's varied treatment of efforts
to remedy societal discrimination. In one respect, the Court's
attention to societal discrimination has been quite limited, as the
Court has never sought to define what it means by the term societal
discrimination. Moreover, its explicit discussion of the concept has
been confined principally to two cases, which have then been
extended to other affirmative action cases without significant
discussion.2 4 At the same time, the Court has addressed the issue
indirectly on a number of occasions, and even though the Court has
been quite hostile to the government's explicit efforts to remedy
societal discrimination, it has been far more receptive to indirect
private and occasional governmental efforts designed to remedy
societal discrimination.21 The first part of this section provides an
overview of the Court's treatment of societal discrimination-both
directly and indirectly-and in the second part, I define societal
discrimination with an intent to sharpen the analytical focus on the
question of whether the government can use its spending power to
remedy societal discrimination.
A. The Supreme Court's Treatment of Societal Discrimination
1. The Affirmative Action Cases
The Court's first and most important discussion of societal
discrimination arose in the famous affirmative action case of Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke, in which Allan Bakke
challenged the preferential admissions policy administered by the
medical school at the University of California at Davis 6 When the
23. See infra notes 239-319 and accompanying text.
24. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). I discuss both cases below.
25. See, for example, infra Part I.A.2 (discussing disparate impact theory, which, as I
explain, is a theory that permits remedying societal discrimination).
26. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). One year earlier the Court upheld a federal statute that
provided greater retirement benefits to women than to men. See Califano v. Webster, 430
1582 [Vol. 80
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medical school opened in 1968, there were no African-American or
Latino students in the class of 100 even though minorities constituted
nearly one-third of the state's population.27 Shortly thereafter the
school soughtto diversify its class by setting aside a fixed number of
places for disadvantaged students, a classification that included
applicants who were members of minority groups, as well as others
who successfully petitioned for disadvantaged status.2 Given that the
school had no history of its own to explain the lack of minority
students, the school sought to justify its policy based on the history of
discrimination African Americans and other minorities had
experienced in society more generally; in other words, it sought to
justify its policy as necessary to remedy the effects of what has come
to be labeled societal discrimination. However, in what has become a
critical and frequent legal strategy,29 the school did not document that
history of societal discrimination but instead largely assumed it based
on the exclusion of minorities from the school's entering class." The
absence of minorities in the class, the argument went (and often still
goes), was obviously the product of societal discrimination, so
obvious that the issue did not require any additional proof or
discussion.
In contrast, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and several other
amici, all made a concerted effort to document the history of
discrimination minorities had encountered in California as a way of
explaining why so few minority candidates had applied or been
admitted to the state medical schools.3 Additionally, the United
U.S. 313, 317-18 (1977). The statute was not justified on the basis that the retirement
system had discriminated against women but that the private labor market had
disadvantaged women for many years. I& Even though the Court never used the term
societal discrimination in its decision, the concept arguably applied.
27. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272 (noting that the original class of one hundred "contained
three Asians but no blacks, no Mexican Americans, and no American Indians").
28. See Michael Selmi, The Life of Bakke: An Affirmative Action Retrospective, 87
GEO. L.J. 981, 985 (1999). For a comprehensive discussion of the Bakke case, see JOEL
DREYFUSS & CHARLES LAWRENCE III, THE BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS OF
INEQUALrrY (1979).
29. As I have written previously, one of the difficulties in defending affirmative action
plans is that government agencies are often reluctant to admit their own past
discrimination, instead preferring to justify plans based on generalized discrimination. See
Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency and the Affirmative Action Debate,
42 UCLA L. REv. 1251, 1309 (1995) (noting that "employers are understandably reluctant
to present evidence of their own past discrimination in order to justify an affirmative
action program").
30. See Selmi, supra note 28, at 989 (discussing the treatment of discrimination in the
Supreme Court briefs).
31. The Justice Department documented the discrimination that had affected
minority students both within and outside of California, as well as the discrimination black
2002] 1583
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States articulated the rationale for allowing the State of California to
take affirmative measures to remedy societal discrimination.
Contending that it was impractical to restrict a university to
remedying its own discrimination, the government argued:
The principal ... justification [for an affirmative action
program] ... is that racial discrimination elsewhere in
society makes it difficult fairly to evaluate the abilities and
promise of each new applicant without taking his race into
account in evaluating his credentials. ... It follows that no
institution is limited to rectifying only its own
discrimination. If it were, the consequences of
discrimination that spilled over from the discriminator to
society at large would be irreparable, and the victims of
discrimination would be doomed to suffer its consequences
without even the prospect of voluntary assistance.
The argument developed in this short passage remains one of the
clearest statements regarding the government's responsibility to
address discrimination that the government itself did not commit. If
the government did not remedy societal discrimination, no one else
would.
As is well-known, the Bakke case produced a sharply fractured
Court, a splintering that was reflected in six complicated opinions,
none of which conveyed the sentiment of a Court majority. Among
the six opinions, only Justice Powell's opinion directly addressed the
question of whether the government could seek to remedy societal
discrimination.33  Recognizing that one of the goals of the special
admissions program at the medical school was to "counter[] the
applicants faced in applying to medical school. See Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 42-46, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. V. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811).
In addition, the government documented the discrimination black doctors faced in
obtaining jobs and joining medical societies. Id at 47-48. The brief filed by three black
professional groups-the National Medical Association, the National Bar Association, and
the National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education-provided the most
extensive discussion of discrimination within the state of California that justified the
special admissions program. See Selmi, supra note 28, at 989.
32. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 39, Bakke (No. 76-811).
33. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306-10 (opinion of Powell, J.). Justice Brennan's opinion,
concurring and dissenting, noted that Title VI did not "bar the preferential treatment of
racial minorities as a means of remedying past societal discrimination to the extent that
such action is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment." Id- at 328 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). In his separate opinion, Justice Marshall
likewise noted that there was ample precedent "for the conclusion that a university can
employ race-conscious measures to remedy past societal discrimination, without the need
for a finding that those benefited were actually victims of that discrimination." Id. at 400
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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effects of societal discrimination," Justice Powell nevertheless found
that interest insufficiently compelling to justify infringing the rights of
those who did not qualify for the special admissions program.34 He
wrote:
The State certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest
in ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the disabling
effects of identified discrimination. The line of school
desegregation cases, commencing with Brown, attests to the
importance of this state goal and the commitment of the
judiciary to affirm all lawful means toward its attainment. In
the school cases, the States were required by court order to
redress the wrongs worked by specific instances of racial
discrimination. That goal was far more focused than the
remedying of the effects of "societal discrimination," an
amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach
into the past.35
Justice Powell's argument centered on a concern that permitting
the medical school to remedy societal discrimination would allow the
school to exercise its unfettered discretion, or its political power, to
privilege those it arbitrarily viewed as the victims of societal
discrimination. Allowing the program to stand, he argued, would
"convert a remedy heretofore reserved for violations of legal rights
into a privilege that all institutions throughout the Nation could grant
at their pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as victims of
societal discrimination. '36 Earlier in his opinion, Justice Powell noted
that "the white 'majority' itself is composed of various minority
groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior
discrimination at the hands of the State and private individuals, 37
adding that the Court would likely be asked "to evaluate the extent of
the prejudice and consequent harm suffered by various minority
groups. Those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some
arbitrary level of tolerability then would be entitled to preferential
classifications at the expense of individuals belonging to other
groups. '38
The argument articulated by Justice Powell had its genesis in the
political debates that had emerged over affirmative action at the time.
Professor Keith Bybee has recently placed Justice Powell's opinion in
34. Id. at 306 (opinion of Powell, J.).
35. Id. at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.).
36. Id. at 310 (opinion of Powell, J.).
37. 1& at 295 (opinion of Powell, J.).
38. Id. at 296-97 (opinion of Powell, J.) (footnote omitted).
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context by demonstrating that the Justice's concerns relating to the
potential elasticity of societal discrimination were strongly influenced
by a distinctive and prominent political theory that was tied to a
particular, but by no means universal, understanding of interest group
politics.3 9 Under this theory, which was reflected in the writings of
Richard Posner, among others, discrimination was seen as part of the
battle among shifting political alliances, where "[d]iscrimination is no
longer located along any single axis; instead it is exercised along a
variety of different axes, dictated by the ebb and flow of political
rivalry."4 Yet, as Professor Bybee notes, this theory obscures the
historical fact that political alliances do not shift in endless fashion,
but more often reflect a biased and relatively stable operation, one in
which some groups repeatedly come out ahead of others.4'
Not only was Justice Powell's argument informed by a particular
political theory, but his slippery slope concern-namely that it would
be difficult to discern classifications that were properly supported by
past discrimination-appears inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
own Equal Protection jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has long
relied on tiers of scrutiny in the Equal Protection context to evaluate
legislative classifications,42 and it has done so based on the nation's
history of discrimination, which has affected groups in distinct and
varied ways. Indeed, the Court had not previously suggested that it
would be difficult to distinguish the harm those discriminated based
on race suffered from discrimination based on other characteristics
39. See Keith J. Bybee, The Political Significance of Legal Ambiguity: The Case of
Affirmative Action, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 263,277 (2000).
40. Id. For Judge Posner's argument, see Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and
the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. Cr. REv. 1,
7-19.
41. It is noteworthy that this critique of interest group politics existed in the political
science literature at the time Bakke was decided, see, for example, William E. Connolly,
The Challenge of Pluralist Theory, in THE BIAS OF PLURALISM 3, 13-26 (William E.
Connolly ed., 1969), but Justice Powell appeared either unaware of or unattracted to the
critique, preferring instead to ascribe to an older and stronger version of interest group
politics. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 282-83 (opinion of Powell, J.). The role of interest groups and
shifting coalitions continues to occupy a contested place when race is implicated, in
particular in the area of voting rights litigation where African Americans and Latinos have
often been unable to forge coalitions that would enable the group to elect representatives
of their choosing, to use the statutory language. For a discussion of the limits of racial
justice in a majoritarian system, see LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY:
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994).
42. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (applying
strict scrutiny); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (applying heightened scrutiny);
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483,487 (1955) (applying rational basis review).
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such as age,43 and it seems unusually naive to suggest that allowing
affirmative action in the context of race would inevitably lead to
affirmative action in a host of other undefined and arbitrary contexts.
Despite its tenuous foundation, Justice Powell's discussion of
societal discrimination has been deeply influential. As will be
discussed in more detail below, even though no other member of the
Court joined his opinion, it continues to guide affirmative action
jurisprudence to this day, with his condemnation of societal
discrimination having been repeated, generally without comment or
challenge, on many occasions over the past twenty-five years.44
Indeed, as I will show, Justice Powell's opinion has been principally
responsible for the way in which the Supreme Court has considered
the critical issue of the government's ability to remedy societal
discrimination.45
43. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (per curiam) (applying
rationality review to an age discrimination claim under the Equal Protection Clause).
Federal statutes likewise make clear and consistent distinctions among those who are
deserving of protection and those who are not. For example, race, gender, national origin,
and religion are commonly included in the various civil rights statutes, whereas age,
marital or family status, and similar categories have often been excluded from the scope of
a statute's protection. The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination based on family
status, while Title VII does not, and the Fair Housing Act likewise makes some provisions
for age-restricted housing. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) (Title VII); id § 3607 (Title VIII,
Fair Housing Act).
44. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 288 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (relying on Justice Powell's Bakke opinion); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263
F.3d 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2001) (invalidating the University of Georgia's affirmative
action plan); Associated Gen. Contractors v. City & County of San Francisco, 813 F.2d
922, 930 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Justice Powell's opinion); Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.
Supp. 2d 821, 848 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (relying on Justice Powell's opinion to hold that
countering effects of societal discrimination cannot justify a law school affirmative action
program).
45. It is frequently noted that no other Justice joined Justice Powell's opinion, see, for
example, Cass R. Sunstein, The Importance of Political Deliberation and Race-Conscious
Redistricting: Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the Supreme Court, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 1179, 1185 (1996) (noting that although influential, Justice Powell's opinion
"represented the views of Justice Powell alone"), and much has been made of the Fifth
Circuit's determination that Bakke is no longer good law. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d
932, 942-45 (5th Cir. 1996). However, two other appellate courts have recently suggested
that Justice Powell's opinion continues to provide the controlling guidance on affirmative
action in education. See Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law School, 233 F.3d 1188,1201 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke offers the best guidance on
constitutional standards for an educational affirmative action program), cert. denied, 532
U.S. 1051 (2000); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 800 (1st Cir. 1998) (declining to
follow the Fifth Circuit's interpretation). Commentators likewise continue to treat Justice
Powell's opinion as influential. See Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A
Comprehensive Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 34 (2000) (defining Justice Powell's Bakke opinion as "the controlling opinion in what at
least for now remains the Supreme Court's leading affirmative action case").
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In addition to its influence, Justice Powell's discussion is
noteworthy because he never defined societal discrimination, other
than through negative references and juxtaposition. On several
occasions, Justice Powell distinguished societal discrimination from
"identified discrimination 4 6  and "specific instances of racial
discrimination" 47 implying that societal discrimination is defined by
the absence of a provable claim. But his argument that societal
discrimination could be applied to any group consistent with the
interests of political policymakers is especially revealing. From this
passage, it appears that Justice Powell may not have considered
societal discrimination to be a form of discrimination at all, a fact
perhaps reflected in his reference to those who benefited from
preferential policies as the "perceived victims of 'societal
discrimination.' "I While skeptical of societal discrimination, Justice
Powell was obviously concerned with the rights of those who could
not take advantage of the special admissions program-"who bear no
responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special
admissions program are thought to have suffered. '4 9 In other words,
the beneficiaries of the program were not actual victims of
discrimination, while those who were burdened by the program did
not necessarily perpetuate discrimination. As should be apparent,
these are classic anti-affirmative action arguments that were
prominent at the time Bakke was decided."
Although Justice Powell's opinion set the groundwork for what
would ultimately become the Court's position some years later,
Justice Brennan's Bakke opinion, which garnered four votes,
suggested that a desire to remedy societal discrimination could
46. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,309 (1978) (opinion of Powell,
J.).
47. Id at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.).
48. Id. at 310 (opinion of Powell, J.).
49. Id. (opinion of Powell, J.).
50. See, e.g., NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION (1975); Posner,
supra note 40; see also Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: "In Order to Get Beyond
Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race," 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 152-54 (opposing
"racial affirmative action for reasons of both principal and practicality"). Although
Justice Powell clearly appeared hostile to the idea of remedying societal discrimination
through the quota program at issue in the Bakke case, the strength of his hostility was less
clear in light of his vote to approve the consideration of race in the admissions process as
one factor among many. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318. To be sure, he justified the inclusion of
race under the general rubric that universities should be able to create a diverse student
body, id. at 311-12, but the lack of diversity that necessitated the special admissions
program was almost certainly attributable to societal discrimination, a point that was
overlooked in Justice Powell's opinion, and which offered universities an opportunity to
address societal discrimination that would otherwise have limited the diversity of the class.
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provide a constitutionally justifiable basis for affirmative action
programs.5' However, in what was an otherwise lengthy opinion,
Justice Brennan treated societal discrimination relatively briefly. He
noted that it was appropriate for the University to assume that
underrepresentation of minorities in medicine was the "consequence
of a background of deliberate, purposeful discrimination against
minorities in education and in society generally."52  But he also
concluded that the school's
articulated purpose of remedying the effects of past societal
discrimination is ... sufficiently important to justify the use
of race-conscious admissions programs where there is a
sound basis for concluding that minority
underrepresentation is substantial and chronic, and that the
handicap of past discrimination is impeding access of
minorities to Medical School.53
Without explicitly stating the standard of review he was applying,
Justice Brennan took a critical analytic step in this passage that
presaged future doctrinal developments. By labeling the interest of
remedying societal discrimination "important," he implied that it
would satisfy the Court's intermediate level of scrutiny, though
perhaps not its strict standard which generally requires a compelling
governmental interest 4 Indeed, as I discuss below, governmental
efforts to remedy societal discrimination have generally been upheld
once freed from the Court's strict scrutiny.
The importance of the particular level of judicial scrutiny the
Court applied became evident in a case that arose just two years after
Bakke was decided. In Fullilove v. Klutznick,55 the Supreme Court
upheld a federal contract set-aside program without any mention of
societal discrimination, even though the desire to remedy societal
51. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 337 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Brennan's opinion was joined by Justices White, Blackmun, and Marshall. Id. at
324 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall's separate
opinion, which detailed the need for affirmative action programs in more detail than did
Justice Brennan's, reached the same conclusion as Justice Brennan, namely that there was
"ample support for the conclusion that a university can employ race-conscious measures to
remedy past societal discrimination, without the need for a finding that those benefited
were actually victims of that discrimination." Id. at 400 (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
52. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 370-71 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53. Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
54. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to gender classification).
55. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). For an extensive discussion of the Fullilove case, see Drew S.
Days, III, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453 (1987).
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discrimination provided the underlying motive for the government's
contracting program. Fullilove involved a federal program that
required ten percent of federal highway dollars to be distributed to
minority contractors.5 6 As noted by the Court, the legislative record
plainly identified societal discrimination as the program's rationale:
"Currently, we more often encounter a business system which is
actually racially neutral on its face, but because of past overt social
and economic discrimination is presently operating, in effect, to
perpetuate these past inequities. '57  As a result of that societal
discrimination, the program sought to direct funds into the minority
community to address the demonstrated inequities.58  These
inequities, as detailed in the legislative record, were the product of
social and economic forces, and were not directly linked to the actions
of the federal government. Yet the Supreme Court upheld the
program primarily as a valid effort to eradicate the "present effects of
past discrimination,"5 9 a phrase that is often used as a synonym for
societal discrimination.
As in Bakke, the Fullilove Court was unable to forge a majority
opinion, and in this instance Chief Justice Burger wrote a plurality
opinion for two other members of the Court that is notable
principally for its obscurity. The plurality eschewed any particular
standard of review, concluding instead that "the MBE [(Minority
Business Enterprises)] provision would survive judicial review under
either 'test' articulated in the several Bakke opinions,"' and likewise
failed to ground the decision in any particular constitutional power,
relying instead on the Spending Clause, Commerce Clause, and
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 61 Although the opinion
included no extensive discussion of the issue, Fullilove remains the
only case where in which the Court connected contract set-aside
programs with the spending power by acknowledging Congress's
power under the Spending Clause "to further broad policy objectives
by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance with
56. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 454 (plurality opinion).
57. Id at 466 n.48 (plurality opinion) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1791, at 182 (1977)).
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell cited this language as well, id. at 505 (Powell, J.,
concurring), and he went further to conclude that "the legislative history ... demonstrates
that Congress reasonably concluded that private and governmental discrimination had
contributed to the negligible percentage of public contracts awarded minority
contractors." Id at 503 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
58. I& at 459 (plurality opinion).
59. Id at 480 (plurality opinion).
60. Id. at 492 (plurality opinion).
61. Id at 473-76 (plurality opinion).
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federal statutory and administrative directives."'62  In separate
concurring opinions, Justices Powell and Marshall applied their
earlier opinions from Bakke to uphold the program-Justice Powell
under a standard of strict scrutiny, while Justice Marshall applied
what was equivalent to an intermediate level of review.63 Counting
up the Justices and putting the different opinions in Fullilove
together, it appears that at this point in the development of the
doctrine a majority of the Supreme Court was willing to allow the
federal government to use its funds to remedy societal discrimination.
At the same time, it is not easy to reconcile the Court's treatment
of the government's power to remedy societal discrimination in
Fullilove with the Court's prior discussion in Bakke, especially
because the Fullilove plurality only cursorily mentioned the earlier
case. The programs are readily distinguishable, however. One
potential difference has already been noted: Congress created a
legislative record to support the contracting program addressed in
Fullilove, whereas the Davis Medical School established its program
without the benefit of any legislative or administrative findings.
Nevertheless, given that the findings in Fullilove did not directly
implicate the federal government in the industry's discriminatory
practices, the mere presence of a legislative record documenting
societal discrimination within the industry should not have overcome
Justice Powell's constitutional concerns expressed in his Bakke
opinion, because the government was not attempting to remedy its
own discrimination.64
Rather, the more significant difference between the two cases
involved the abilities of the federal and state governments to remedy
societal discrimination. The plurality decision in Fullilove rested in
62. Id. at 474 (plurality opinion). In one sense, it might be said that the plurality
rested its decision on the Spending Clause, given that the Spending Clause was initially
mentioned as the proper constitutional authority. Yet, the plurality then noted that the
Spending Clause reaches at least as far as the Commerce Clause, and that insofar as
Congress could have "achieved its objectives under the Commerce Clause ... the
objectives.., are within the scope of the Spending Power." Id at 476 (plurality opinion).
63. See id. at 496 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("I join the [plurality] opinion and write
separately to apply the analysis set forth by my opinion in ... Bakke."); id at 517
(Marshall, J., concurring) ("My resolution of the constitutional issue in this case is
governed by the separate opinion I coauthored in ... Bakke."). As in Bakke, Justice
Powell wrote only for himself, while Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined Justice
Marshall's concurring opinion. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
Rehnquist, which largely repudiated nonremedial race-conscious measures, and Justice
Stevens filed a dissenting opinion arguing against remedial affirmative action. See id. at
522 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 532 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
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significant part on the federal government's power to remedy
discrimination through the Spending Clause as interpreted through
the Commerce Clause, the latter involving a power not available to
state governments. As a supporting theory, the plurality likewise
noted Congress's remedial power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment,65 a power that is explicitly reserved for the federal
government. This difference in remedial power rendered the federal
program subject to a greater level of judicial deference, though as was
also true in Bakke, the Court failed to reach a consensus on what the
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny should be. Commentators have
generally interpreted Fullilove as applying an intermediate level of
scrutiny, and that level of scrutiny appeared critical to the outcome of
the case, particularly as the Court's doctrine progressed.66 At the
same time, the Court's failure to address directly the government's
role in remedying societal discrimination left the scope of its power
largely unsettled, and it was another seven years before the Court
again confronted the question of the government's power to remedy
societal discrimination.
On this occasion, the Court began to coalesce around a position
rejecting societal discrimination as a remedial basis for affirmative
action. The case, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,67 involved
the efforts of a school board to preserve the effects of its recent
affirmative action hiring by agreeing to forego seniority-based layoffs
65. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 474-76 (plurality opinion).
66. See Marci A. Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of
Proportionality Analysis Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZO L.
REV. 469, 477 (1999) (noting that "the Court took its cue from Fullilove ... and held in
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC that intermediate scrutiny" was appropriate); J. Edmond
Nathanson, Congressional Power to Contradict the Supreme Court's Constitutional
Decisions: Accommodation of Rights in Conflict, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 331, 347
(1986) ("In Fullilove, the Court reviewed an affirmative action plan under what apparently
was an intermediate level of scrutiny."); Laura M. Padilla, Intersectionality & Positionality:
Situating Women of Color in the Affirmative Action Dialogue, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 843,
903 n.305 (1997) (defining Fullilove as applying an intermediate level of scrutiny). As a
number of commentators have pointed out, the plurality opinion in Fullilove suggested
that the program under consideration could withstand even the Court's strict level of
scrutiny, which might suggest that the level of scrutiny was not dispositive at least at the
time of the Court's decision. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Affirmative Action After Reagan, 68
TEX. L. REv. 353, 375 (1989) (defining Fullilove as having applied strict scrutiny). While
it is true that the plurality intimated that the program could be withheld under any
standard, it is likewise true that as the Court's doctrine progressed, culminating in its
decision in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), the standard of review
applied in Fullilove became increasingly important and was increasingly treated as
equivalent to intermediate review. See infra text accompanying notes 87-92.
67. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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in order to retain a certain percentage of minority faculty members. 6
The school board sought to justify its program on several different
grounds, including a desire to remedy societal discrimination.69
Writing for a plurality of the Court, and applying a test of strict
scrutiny, Justice Powell rejected this justification, noting: "This Court
never has held that societal discrimination alone is sufficient to justify
a racial classification. Rather, the Court has insisted upon some
showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved
before allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy
such discrimination. '70
Justice Powell's rationale for this categorical rejection focused on
the difficulty of defining societal discrimination with precision, an
argument that largely repeated the themes he had developed in his
Bakke opinion. "Societal discrimination, without more," Justice
Powell wrote:
is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified
remedy .... No one doubts that there has been serious
racial discrimination in this country. But as the basis for
imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against
innocent people, societal discrimination is insufficient and
over expansive. In the absence of particularized findings, a
court could uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach
into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the
future.71
Justice O'Connor, who provided the critical fifth vote to
invalidate the layoff plan at issue in Wygant, devoted only one
sentence of her concurring opinion to the goal of remedying societal
discrimination, agreeing with the plurality's conclusion that
" 'societal' discrimination, that is, discrimination not traceable to its
68. IM at 272 (plurality opinion).
69. Id. at 274 (plurality opinion). There was also, however, evidence of past
discrimination as well as evidence that the school board voluntarily agreed to the
affirmative action plan to avoid being sued for discrimination. See iU at 287 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("The Michigan Civil Rights Commission determined that the evidence
before it supported the allegations of discrimination on the part of the Jackson School
Board, though that determination was never reduced to formal findings because the
School Board... voluntarily chose to remedy the perceived violation.").
70. Id at 274 (plurality opinion).
71. Id. at 276 (plurality opinion). In a footnote, Justice Powell also made what might
be considered a contradictory, but revealing, argument, namely that societal
discrimination was too pervasive to serve as the basis for governmental relief and, if
allowed, would effectively permit any and all governmental efforts. See i& at 278 n.5.
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own actions, cannot be deemed sufficiently compelling to pass
constitutional muster under strict scrutiny. '72
Although the Court's discussion of the government's role of
remedying societal discrimination was brief, the Wygant case
established a broad prohibition on the government's remedial power,
and the case remains deeply influential and widely cited.7 3 Yet,
harkening back to the Court's doctrinal reverberations in Bakke and
Fullilove, the very next Term the Court approved a gender-based
affirmative action plan that was intended to remedy a manifest
imbalance in the agency's workforce, an imbalance attributable to
societal discrimination. The case, Johnson v. Transportation Agency
of Santa Clara County,74 arose when the agency hired its first female
dispatcher in the early 1980s, selecting her over a male employee who
had scored modestly higher on the subjective employment
examination used to qualify individuals for the position.75 When the
male employee sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the agency justified its decision by arguing that it was seeking to
address what was labeled a "manifest imbalance" in its workforce,
namely the fact that no woman had ever held one of the 238 skilled
positions within the agency.76 Importantly, the agency contended that
the imbalance resulted from undefined social forces, rather than from
72. l at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
73. For cases relying on Wygant to the effect that a desire to remedy societal
discrimination will not support an affirmative action plan, see, for example, Eisenberg v.
Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 129 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S.
1019 (2000); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 794 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. dismissed, 529
U.S. 1050 (2000); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 171 (1st Cir. 1996); Middleton v.
City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396, 402 (6th Cir. 1996); Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1560
(3d Cir. 1996); Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 91 F.3d 586, 597 (3d Cir. 1996);
Hayes v. N. State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207,217 (4th Cir. 1993); Stuart
v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446, 451 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840
F.2d 1096, 1101-02 (2d Cir. 1988). The Wygant case was complicated by the introduction
of what is generally referred to as "the role model theory" as one of the school board's
justifications for its affirmative action policy. The school board argued that it was
necessary to retain minority teachers to provide minority students with appropriate role
models, a theory the Court the plurality found particularly troubling in that it seemed to
assume that black students could benefit only from having black role models, an argument
the Court the plurality perceived as a form of racial stereotyping. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276.
74. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
75. Id. at 623-25. One of the interesting, and often overlooked, aspects of Johnson is
that the test score differences at issue were trivially different from one another, and not
likely to have reflected any significant differences in ability. See Selmi, supra note 29, at
1252, 1274. The government argued throughout the litigation that the candidates were
roughly equivalent in their qualifications. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, A CONFLICT OF
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 12 (1991).
76. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 621.
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its own actions.77 While the Court majority never used the term
"societal discrimination" in its opinion, it was plain that Santa Clara
County attributed the deficit to societal discrimination and adopted
its affirmative action plan as a means to remedy that discrimination.78
By upholding the agency's decision to take gender into account in the
promotional decision, the Court impliedly affirmed the county's
power to remedy societal discrimination.7 9
Perhaps to avoid some of the concerns regarding the potential
vagueness of the concept of societal discrimination, the Court
restricted the government's permissible efforts to those that were
intended to remedy a "manifest imbalance" in the workforce, which it
further defined to apply to traditionally segregated job categories
where an adequate labor force was available.80 These limitations may
have appeased the concerns of Justice Powell, who joined the
majority's opinion,8 but they struck a chord with Justice Scalia, who
filed a scathing dissenting opinion. Justice Scalia, who had only
recently been appointed to the Court, concluded that "[t]he most
significant proposition of law established by today's decision is that
racial or sexual discrimination is permitted under Title VII when it is
intended to overcome the effect, not of the employer's own
discrimination, but of societal attitudes."'
Given the absence of any record documenting the agency's own
discrimination, Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion seems on the mark,
but two aspects of the Johnson case might distinguish it from the
earlier decisions. Johnson involved a challenge under Title VII rather
77. UROFSKY, supra note 75, at 61.
78. The argument the county made was based almost entirely on the lack of women in
the positions without any reference to the county's responsibility for the workforce
imbalance. Id
79. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 621.
80. Id. at 632.
81. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion for five members of the Court,
including Justice Powell. Justice Stevens and O'Connor filed concurring opinions, and
Justice Scalia, in his first term on the Court, filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 612.
82. Id. at 664 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It seems safe to say that Justice Scalia believed
that the primary cause of the workforce imbalance was not discrimination but was rather
the product of choice, although choice that was perhaps influenced by societal attitudes.
He wrote:
It is absurd to think that the nationwide failure of road maintenance crews ... to
achieve the Agency's ambition of 36.4% female representation is attributable
primarily, if even substantially, to systematic exclusion of women eager to
shoulder pick and shovel. It is a "traditionally segregated job category" ... in the
sense that, because of longstanding social attitudes, it has not been regarded by
women themselves as desirable work.
Id. at 668 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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than the Constitution, and it may be that the remedial power under
Title VII is broader than what is permitted under the Constitution. In
Johnson itself there was some dispute between the majority and
dissenting opinions regarding the scope of Title VII, and the majority
obliquely suggested that the statute's remedial reach was potentially
broader than the Constitution.83 But this was an issue the Court did
not definitively resolve, and more recently lower courts have adopted
the position articulated in Justice Scalia's dissent defining the
constitutional and statutory standards as equivalent, at least as
applied to public employers.'
A better understanding of Johnson is that a governmental desire
to remedy societal discrimination can satisfy the Court's intermediate
level of scrutiny. The Supreme Court has long applied an
intermediate level of review to gender classifications, under which
such a classification will be upheld if it is substantially related to an
important governmental objective.5 This analysis runs up against the
fact that the Court does not typically rely on tiers of scrutiny to
interpret Title VII,86 and ultimately it is difficult to know whether the
Court was influenced by an intermediate standard of review in
upholding the plan at issue in Johnson. At the same time, finding that
the plan was justified under a lower level of review helps reconcile the
Court's doctrine; in particular it helps reconcile the case with Wygant,
83. See id at 627 n.6. In contrast, Justice Scalia argued that Title VII could not permit
broader remedial authority than the Constitution allowed. Id at 664-67 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
84. See, e.g., Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1559-60 (3d Cir. 1996) (treating
standards under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause as the same); Cygnar v. City of
Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 838-40 (7th Cir. 1989) (same); see also George Rutherglen &
Daniel R. Ortiz, Affirmative Action Under the Constitution and Title VII: From Confusion
to Convergence, 35 UCLA L. REV. 467 (1988) (arguing that the two standards should be
treated similarly). A number of courts have faithfully sought to follow the suggestion in
Johnson that Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause need not be treated as having the
same reach with respect to affirmative action plans. To the extent courts have been able
to discern a difference, they tend to focus on the "manifest imbalance" in the workforce,
which may be sufficient to justify a plan under Title VII but not the Constitution. See
Smith v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 84 F.3d 672, 686 n.4 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that the
existence of a "manifest imbalance" may justify remedial efforts under Title VII).
85. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977) (applying the standard
established in Boren); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (establishing intermediate
scrutiny as the appropriate level of review for gender classifications).
86. There are some limited exceptions. For example, race cannot provide the basis
for a bona fide occupational qualification defense, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994), and
employers have an accommodation defense to a claim based on religious discrimination
that is not available for race, gender, or national origin. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 72 (1977) (requiring reasonable accommodation for the religious
needs of employees so long as they do not impose "undue hardship").
SOCIETAL DISCRIMINATION
which was decided only a year earlier and, without a different level of
review, is otherwise difficult to square with the Court's holding in
Johnson.
A reading based on an intermediate level of review is also
consistent with the Court's consideration of societal discrimination in
more recent cases involving contract set-asides. In City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson,87 the Supreme Court struck down the City of
Richmond's contract set-aside plan which required prime contractors
to subcontract at least thirty percent of the city's contracts to firms
that qualified as minority business enterprises.8 For the first time in
the Court's complicated affirmative action jurisprudence, a majority
of the Court applied a strict level of scrutiny to the city's plan, and
found that the city had failed to justify the need for its program under
that standard. 9 As had been true of all the previous affirmative
action cases, Richmond had failed to document its own discrimination
to explain why so few of its contracting dollars went to minority
contractors, and instead relied on generalized findings of societal
discrimination.90 Returning to the arguments first made by Justice
Powell in Bakke, the Court rejected the city's justification, noting that
"[t]o accept Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination alone
can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the
door to competing claims for 'remedial relief for every disadvantaged
group."9
1
The Croson case is widely seen as having solidified the Court's
proscription on societal discrimination as a justification for race-
conscious affirmative action efforts,92 yet the Court's opinions were
devoid of any analysis relating to societal discrimination beyond what
had been traversed in earlier cases. Indeed, just as important as the
87. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
88. Id. at 481,505 (plurality opinion).
89. Id at 505 (plurality opinion); id at 524-26 (Scalia, J., concurring).
90. Id at 504 (plurality opinion).
91. Id at 505 (plurality opinion).
92. See, e.g., Ayres & Vars, supra note 2, at 1584 (noting that after Croson, "[ilt is
clear that certain forms of 'societal discrimination' do not create a sufficient factual
predicate" for governmental affirmative action programs); Ruth Bader Ginsburg &
Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 267 (1999) (claiming that "[s]tate and local attempts to remedy
'societal discrimination' have not survived Court scrutiny" after Croson); Paul Mishkin,
Foreword: The Making of a Turning Point-Metro and Adarand, 84 CAL. L. REV. 875,
877 (1996) (noting that a majority in Croson reaffirmed "Wygant's rejection of societal
discrimination as a basis for state affirmative action"); Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative
Action and Discrimination, 39 How. L.J. 1, 28 (1995) (concluding that Croson held that a
desire to remedy societal discrimination will not meet the Court's strict scrutiny).
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Court's ban on remedying societal discrimination was Justice
O'Connor's recognition that the City of Richmond had the power to
remedy private discrimination through its spending power so long as
it did so in a manner that was consistent with equal protection
mandates. Writing for three members of the Court, Justice O'Connor
stated, "As a matter of state law, the City of Richmond has legislative
authority over its procurement policies, and can use its spending
powers to remedy private discrimination, if it identifies that
discrimination with the particularity required by the Fourteenth
Amendment."93  Justice O'Connor-as is typical of her race
discrimination opinions94 -failed to articulate what the requisite
particularity might be, or under what circumstances she might be
willing to uphold race conscious efforts instituted through the
government's spending power, choosing instead to leave the issue
unresolved and unexplored. 95
The Court's struggle to define the contours of permissible
government actions continued in the following term when the
Supreme Court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to uphold a
federal preference program similar in many respects to the program
reviewed in Croson. The program at issue in Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC6 provided preferences in distributing broadcast licenses and
93. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492 (plurality opinion). The three dissenting Justices likewise
agreed that the city had a compelling interest in ensuring that its funds were not used to
further discrimination or its effects, though the dissenters chided the plurality for
derisively labeling the discrimination that had affected the contracting industry as "mere
'societal discrimination' "rather than as established evidence of past discrimination. Id. at
541 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94. Justice O'Connor has made it a judicial habit to theoretically leave the door open
on race-conscious governmental efforts, though she has yet to find a race-conscious plan
that she found consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. This has been particularly
true of her voting rights decisions where, while joining the Court to invalidate race-
conscious districts, she repeatedly claims that she would vote to uphold a district under
proper circumstances. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996) (plurality opinion)
(invalidating a Texas district and noting that "compliance with the results test [of section
2] ... can be a compelling state interest"); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928-29 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Application of the Court's standard does not throw into
doubt the vast majority of the Nation's 435 congressional districts ... even though race
may well have been considered in the redistricting process."). In an apparent break from
her past record, last Term, Justice O'Connor joined the Court majority to uphold a North
Carolina district on the ground that its boundaries were politically rather than racially-
motivated. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001) ("The basic question is
whether the legislature drew ... boundaries because of race rather than because of
political behavior.").
95. For an excellent attempt to give meaning to Justice O'Connor's suggestion, see
Ayres & Vars, supra note 2, at 1577.
96. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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was intended to encourage and enhance minority participation in the
broadcasting industry.97  Rather than relying on societal
discrimination to justify the preferences, the program's rationale
turned on a controversial argument that promoting minority
ownership would likewise promote a diversity of views on the
airwaves, which the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had
determined was seriously lacking in many markets.98 In one of his last
opinions for the Court, Justice Brennan applied an intermediate level
of review to conclude that increasing broadcast diversity was an
important governmental objective that the program was reasonably
designed to serve.99
Although the Court did not discuss societal discrimination in
Metro Broadcasting, the majority's opinion rested in significant part
on a constitutional concern analogous to a principle informing the
government's spending powers. One reason the Court upheld the
FCC's preference program was because it has long treated the
airwaves as involving a limited public resource that is regulated by the
government for the public good.1°° Relying on its past precedent, the
Court noted that "[s]afeguarding the public's right to receive a
diversity of views ... is therefore an integral component of the FCC's
mission," ' and this recognition of the government's power to pursue
its own vision of furthering racial justice will prove relevant to
applying the government funding cases to remedying societal
discrimination. °2
Nevertheless, the Court's decision in Metro Broadcasting had an
unusually short shelf life. Following significant changes in Court
97. Id. at 560.
98. Without mentioning the term societal discrimination, the Court did note that the
"'effects of past inequities stemming from racial and ethnic discrimination have resulted
in a severe underrepresentation of minorities in the media of mass communications.'" Id
at 566 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-765, at 43 (1982)).
99. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 600-01. An aspect of the FCC policy that is often
overlooked by its critics is that the program was based on extensive legislative findings
that documented the link between minority ownership and a diversity of views. As Justice
Brennan noted, "The FCC's conclusion that there is an empirical nexus between minority
ownership and broadcasting diversity is a product of its expertise, and we accord its
judgment deference." Id. at 570.
100. See id. at 566-67 (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,390 (1969)).
101. Id. at 567.
102. Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion stressed that the FCC program had not
been enacted pursuant to the government's Section 5 powers to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, and specifically left open the nature of Congress's "considerable latitude" to
use its Section 5 powers. See id. at 605-06 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent likewise
reiterated its rejection of societal discrimination as a compelling governmental interest.
See id. at 613-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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membership, 3 the Supreme Court reversed itself five years later by
holding in Adarand Constructors v. Pena that all governmental racial
classifications, federal and state alike, are subject to the Court's strict
level of review.14 Importantly, the Adarand case did not alter the
essential conclusion of the Metro Broadcasting decision that certain
objectives might be upheld under an intermediate or rational level of
scrutiny but would not survive the Court's strict scrutiny.0 The
Court also left open the possibility, initially raised in Croson, that it
might uphold governmental efforts designed to remedy private
discrimination when it referred to the "unhappy persistence of both
the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination," noting
that the "government is not disqualified from acting in response to
it."106
This review of the Court's doctrine offers several critical insights
into the government's power to remedy societal discrimination.
Perhaps most important, it seems beyond question that the Court's
level of scrutiny has proved determinative in nearly all of the cases
reviewed. 0 7 Although the Court has equivocated on the proper
standard to apply in reviewing federal programs, it has plainly held
that programs designed to remedy societal discrimination will not
satisfy the Court's strict scrutiny, although the programs may be
upheld under a lower level of review. I later argue that when
governmental remedial efforts are tied to the spending power they
are properly analyzed under a form of rational basis review and
therefore should be upheld so long as the programs do not rely on
103. Both Metro Broadcasting and Adarand were decided by five-member majorities,
and by the time Adarand was decided, Justices Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg had
replaced Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White. When Justice Brennan retired from the
Court, a high-ranking official at the Justice Department reportedly pronounced the death
of Metro Broadcasting, but it was actually Justice Thomas who cast the deciding vote in
Adarand, from which Justice Souter dissented.
104. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) ("[R]acial
classifications ... must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly
tailored to further that interest.").
105. See Charles Fried, Comment, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC:- Two Concepts of
Equality, 104 HARv. L. REV. 107, 111-12 (1990) (criticizing Metro Broadcasting for using
an intermediate level of scrutiny).
106. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237; see also Ayres & Vars, supra note 2, at 1585 (discussing
ways in which government can redress private discrimination).
107. Lower courts have upheld gender-related affirmative action programs under an
intermediate level of scrutiny, while invalidating the race-specific aspects of a program.
See Eng'g Contractors Ass'n v. Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 909 (11th Cir. 1997)
("[I]t is clear to us that a gender-conscious affirmative action program can rest safely on




racial quotas.08 The Supreme Court has never defined the concept of
societal discrimination, even though a proper definition would help
explicate what the programs are actually intended to remedy.
Despite the lack of a definition, the Court's concerns regarding
societal discrimination-originally articulated by Justice Powell in his
Bakke opinion-are readily identifiable. When it comes to
remedying societal discrimination, the Court is troubled by the
possibility that allowing race-based remedies would lead to a slippery
remedial slope where a program might be based on attenuated forms
of discrimination, and may just as likely be the result of political
preferences or power as actual discrimination. In addition, there is a
critical subtext to the Court's decisions, alluded to by Justice Powell
in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,10 9 namely that given the
pervasive influence of societal discrimination, allowing governments
to remedy societal discrimination might entail too much affirmative
action-too much redistribution of existing resources. This is a
concern the Court has expressed on a number of occasions, and one
that has helped shape its Equal Protection doctrine, including as it
relates to remedying societal discrimination."'
2. Societal Discrimination and Disparate Impact Theory
Although societal discrimination is most prominent in the
Court's affirmative action jurisprudence, it permeates the Court's
entire antidiscrimination doctrine. In its redistricting cases, for
example, the Court has acknowledged the role societal discrimination
has played in producing polarized voting patterns. The effects of
societal discrimination have often necessitated drawing district lines
in a way that would provide minority voters with the statutorily
required opportunity to elect candidates of their choice consistent
with the dictates of the Voting Rights Act."' As was true in the
affirmative action context, the Court has found societal
discrimination to be a constitutionally inadequate basis for taking
108. See Part III.A infra.
109. 476 U.S. 267,278 n.5.
110. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (noting that permitting a
constitutional disparate impact challenge would have required intervening in many aspects
of the status quo); see also Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality
of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEo. LJ. 279, 322-23 (1997) (discussing cases where the
Court has shied away from challenges that would "invalidat[e] an extensive array of social
services").
111. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 66-70 (1986) (discussing polarized voting
patterns resulting from societal discrimination).
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race into account in drawing district lines.112 The Court has also
recognized the role societal discrimination has played in producing
and preserving segregated school districts, though increasingly the
Court sees such results as the product of private preferences that are
disconnected from discrimination.1 3
While the concept of societal discrimination has played a
relatively minor role in the voting and education contexts, it has
played a strong supporting role in the development of the disparate
impact theory as applied to employment discrimination. The Court
first recognized the disparate impact theory in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., when the Supreme Court held that an employer may be required
to take action to remedy the disparate racial effects of its employment
practices even when those effects are not the product of intentional
discrimination." 4 At issue in the Griggs case was a requirement that
workers possess a high school degree and pass two written
examinations in order to be assigned outside of the labor
department.1 5 As a result of the schooling system in North Carolina,
where the case arose, far more whites than blacks had high school
degrees, and whites also performed substantially better on the written
examinations." 6 In approving the disparate impact theory as a valid
interpretation of Title VII, the Court explained, "Because they are
Negroes, petitioners have long received inferior education in
segregated schools. 1 7 As should be clear, this is nothing other than a
recognition of the role societal discrimination had played in
producing a discriminatory education system that spilled over into the
112. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1996) (invalidating a North Carolina
congressional district); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 921 (1995) (invalidating Georgia's
congressional redistricting). As I have noted previously, the redistricting cases resemble
affirmative action cases. See Selmi, supra note 110, at 317 (arguing that "the redistricting
cases are ... akin to affirmative action cases"). The Supreme Court recently reversed a
lower court determination that a redrawn North Carolina district had been impermissibly
drawn on the basis of race. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001). The
Supreme Court held that the evidence did not support the conclusion that "race, rather
than politics, predominantly" explained the district lines. Id.
113. This sentiment is particularly prevalent in the Court's recent education cases. See
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 87-89 (1995) (rejecting the argument that white flight was
attributable to segregation); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485 (1992) (attributing
continued racial imbalance in schools to demographic shifts); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498
U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991) (noting that the duty of school districts extends only to taking
necessary steps to eliminate de jure segregation).
114. Griggs, 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971).
115. Ida at 427-28. The test requirements were imposed the day after Title VII became
effective and likely could have been challenged under a theory of intentional
discrimination. See id. at 427.
116. Id. at 428.
117. Id. at 430.
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workplace. The plaintiffs made no allegation, after all, that the
company had in any way contributed to the discriminatory education
system, and yet to ensure that tests did not serve as an "artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barrier[] to employment" the Court
required employers to establish that the disputed employment
practice "bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance
of the jobs for which it is used.""' 8 What the Court left unanswered,
however, is why a private employer should be required to take steps
to remedy the effects of governmentally supported and imposed
segregation, particularly when the Court has largely forbidden
governments from taking such action. Indeed, one of the many
ironies in the Court's antidiscrimination jurisprudence is that only
private entities can remedy what is a distinctly social problem. Part of
the reason for this strange turn of events is that neither the Court nor
the commentators has adequately defined societal discrimination, an
issue to which I now turn.
B. Defining Societal Discrimination
The Court's doctrine as it relates to the government's power to
remedy societal discrimination has always been deficient because the
Court has never defined the term. Yet, defining the concept of
societal discrimination is crucial to understanding the government's
desire to take actions to effect its remedy; moreover, how the term is
defined may ultimately influence a court's analysis. For example,
societal discrimination might be defined as discrimination for which
there is no identifiable responsible party, public or private. It might
alternatively be defined as discrimination that occurred some time in
the past with an identifiable party that is no longer legally culpable
because the statute of limitations has run or the effects of the
discrimination are now too attenuated to trace.119 As just noted,
disparate results may also be associated with societal discrimination,
as might the lingering effects of past discrimination. 20 The term may
also serve as a surrogate for identifiable discrimination in the
circumstance where a governmental entity is reluctant to admit or
118. Id. at 431. The test, with some modifications, has now been codified as part of
Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (1994).
119. As Girardeau Spann has commented, "The connection between past
discrimination and present disadvantage, while undeniable in the abstract, is something
that is often incapable of direct proof in particular cases, because the diverse effects of
past discrimination have generalized throughout the society in ways that are pervasive yet
undifferentiated." Spann, supra note 92, at 51.
120. See supra Part I.A.2.
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prove its own discrimination.121 Finally, as I will suggest below,
societal discrimination might best be seen as the cumulative effects of
multiple acts and actors-a combination of all the factors identified
above-something the government ought to address because no other
comprehensive remedy is available. Before settling on a precise
definition, it will first be helpful first to identify the definition that
lurks behind the Court's jurisprudence.
1. Discrimination in the Air
Based on the way in which the Supreme Court has considered
the concept of societal discrimination, it appears the Court's common
working definition is also the most obtuse and unhelpful. The Court
sees societal discrimination as anything that is not identifiably, or
lawfully, attributable to the particular defendant," what amounts to a
form of "discrimination in the air" insofar as the discrimination is not
tied to any particular culpable party. While acknowledging the
presence of discrimination in the abstract, there is no party available
to hold accountable. As an analytical concept, discrimination in the
air proves rather empty for it begs the important question of how the
results that seek to be remedied-the absence of contracting dollars
121. Speaking of Santa Clara County's difficulty in defending its promotion decision in
the Johnson case, Melvin Urofsky aptly characterizes the dilemma as compelling the
county to decide "how to defend a program based on an assumption of prior bias without
admitting that the county had, in fact, discriminated against women." UROFSKY, supra
note 75, at 83 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court has likewise recognized the
difficulty in requiring governments to document their own discrimination. See Johnson v.
Transp. Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 633 (1987) ("A corporation
concerned with maximizing return on investment ... is hardly likely to adopt a[n
affirmative action] plan if in order to do so it must compile evidence that could be used to
subject it to a colorable Title VII suit."); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
290 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (requiring findings of past discrimination would
undermine efforts at ensuring voluntary compliance with antidiscrimination law). In the
case of Diane Joyce, there was, in fact, substantial evidence of discrimination. The
dispatcher office in which she sought work was described as an old boy network
"impenetrable to outsiders," and in 1974, Diane Joyce's first effort to take the road
dispatcher test was rebuffed because she lacked road crew experience. See UROFSKY,
supra note 75, at 4-12. That same year Paul Johnson was allowed to take the test despite
his lack of experience, and it was this experience as a road dispatcher, discriminatorily
denied to Joyce, that he later relied on to argue that he was better qualified for the
position that ultimately went to Joyce. Id.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37, 67-72. By the term "lawfully," I mean
to refer to the Court's disparate impact cases where it has never used the term societal
discrimination; as a result, it seems fair to suggest that the Court does not believe such
cases raise questions relating to societal discrimination, but instead involve a form of
discrimination that is at least statutorily chargeable to the particular defendant even if the
defendant had little, or nothing, to do with creating the underlying conditions that have
contributed to the results in question.
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to African Americans, for example-arose and who ought to be held
accountable for remedying the disparity. Indeed, in the fashion used
by the Court, the term societal discrimination is little more than a
legal conclusion, one that means discrimination for which no one is
legally responsible.
2. Societal Discrimination as Cumulative Acts
A better approach would seek to unpack the nature of societal
discrimination, so as to identify the varied acts that have produced
what we can identify as a discriminatory condition that does not have
an obvious or direct causal actor. One way to understand this
meaning of societal discrimination is to see it as the product of
cumulative acts, none of which may suffice as the primary or sole
cause, but all of which contribute to producing unequal results or
conditions that are racially biased."D These practices will likely have
both public and private aspects, and some may even be so intertwined
that they cannot be easily severable into public or private
components. This difficulty illustrates an important limitation on the
Court's discrimination doctrine-a doctrine that is not structured to
address discrimination that has both public and private components.
Although the Court has crafted rules to accommodate discrimination
with multiple causes, 124 it has never seen fit to derive an analytical
construct for discrimination that is the product of what might be
defined as a public-private partnership, but instead typically defines
such discrimination as beyond judicial reach.
Consider the case of contract set-asides, which are intended to
provide opportunities for minority contractors based on the
assumption, and sometimes the proof, that minorities have not been
afforded adequate or equal access to the contracting industry.125 As
123. For an excellent discussion of how cumulative social effects can have a forceful
impact on perpetrating gender discrimination, see VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY So SLOW?
THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN 1-22 (1998).
124. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,249 (1989) (mixed-motive cases in
employment discrimination); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274,284-87 (1977) (mixed-motive case in First Amendment context).
125. For an interesting exploration of the contract set-aside provision in Richmond, see
W. AVON DRAKE & ROBERT D. HOLSWORTH, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE
STALLED QUEST FOR BLACK PROGRESS 70-94 (1996). For additional discussions of
discrimination in the contracting industry, see Hyman Frankel, Opportunity Denied! New
York State's Study of Racial and Sexual Discrimination Related to Government
Contracting, 26 URB. LAW. 413 (1994); Robert E. Suggs, Racial Discrimination in Business
Transactions, 42 HASTINGS LJ. 1257 (1991); Roger Waldinger & Thomas Bailey, The
Continuing Significance of Race: Racial Conflict & Racial Discrimination in Construction,
19 POL. & SOC'Y 291 (1991).
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noted earlier, the critical question underlying the programs is why so
few minority contractors have shared in public contracting programs,
at least in those cities that have adopted set-aside programs. In
Richmond, Virginia, the city at the center of the dispute in the
Supreme Court's Croson decision, minority contractors obtained less
than one percent of city contracts despite constituting more than half
of the city's population.126 Although the numbers were stark and on
their own appeared quite probative, it was difficult to identify the
cause of the disparities in contract distribution. No evidence was
adduced in the case to suggest that minorities were not sufficiently
skilled to perform the work that was being contracted out, nor was
there any reason to believe, other than by virtue of their
underrepresentation, that minorities were uninterested in the
contracting jobs. Yet, it was also difficult to prove that the city, or
even a particular city contractor, had consciously excluded minorities
from the work, at least after the 1970s or early 80s when outright
exclusion had receded, and the case largely turned on how the
underrepresentation of minorities in the contracting industry should
be interpreted-either as evidence of a lack of interest or as a sign of
discrimination within the industry. 27
This dichotomy, however, is a false one. Based on what is known
about the contracting industry and the skills required for the jobs, the
most likely explanation for the disparity in contract allocation was a
complicated web of discrimination. African Americans were not part
of the word-of-mouth recruitment process that typically defines the
construction business, which often includes many small family
businesses.Y8 In some instances, minority contractors were likely
discouraged from applying or bidding on jobs, and rather than file
discrimination complaints, they may have simply moved into other
occupations that were less openly hostile to their participation. City
contracts were also made available by various personal contacts,
which may have ultimately produced a discriminatory distribution
system that would be difficult to prove under the intent standard the
126. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 479-80 (noting that the
"[p]roponents of the set-aside provision relied on a study which indicated that, while the
general population of Richmond was 50% black, only 0.67% of the city's prime
construction contracts had been awarded to minority businesses in the 5-year period from
1978 to 1983").
127. See Selmi, supra note 110, at 281-82 (discussing the inferences that are drawn
from underrepresentation).
128. DRAKE & HOLSWORTH, supra note 125, at 84 (describing the contacts and
networking necessary in the construction business).
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Court requires for constitutional and relevant statutory claims but
which nevertheless likely skewed the contracting process.
129
African Americans were also likely at a capital disadvantage in
opening their own firms to compete directly for city contracts, a
disadvantage that almost certainly can be traced to the long history of
segregation in Richmond and elsewhereY.30 Indeed, it would not take
much imagination, or documentation, to establish that the
government played a significant role in limiting access to the
contracting business and perpetuating a system that awarded
contracts overwhelmingly to white contractors, and it seems equally
clear that the government should have some responsibility for
remedying these persistent inequities."'
The world of contracting is hardly an isolated example of the
government's role in creating and perpetuating societal
discrimination. Similar stories can be told for discrimination in
voting, education, and housing, though the analysis becomes more
complicated outside the commercial realm of contracting because
these other areas all involve what courts often see as private
preferences that are not easily subject to government regulation.
Nevertheless, with respect to voting, it is easily overlooked that the
need to include race as an explicit factor in drawing districts arises
129. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1171 (10th Cir. 2000)
("The government's evidence strongly supports the thesis that informal, racially
exclusionary business networks dominate the subcontracting construction industry,
shutting out competition from minority firms."), cert. granted, 532 U.S. 941 (2001), cert.
dismissed, 534 U.S. 103 (2001).
130. See The Compelling Interest for Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, 61
FED. REG. 26042, 26058 (May 23, 1996) (detailing discrimination in capital markets). See
generally MELVIN L. OLIVER & THoMAs M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE
WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECrIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (1995) (describing disparity in
wealth between blacks and whites).
131. The notion that the government had an obligation to undo the past practices
provided the underlying rationale for the adoption of construction goals in Richmond. See
DRAKE AND HOLSWORTH, supra note 125, at 68-71. The economic set-aside programs
arose after a black majority was elected to the city council and were part of a larger effort
to help "shape economic development policy to benefit African Americans" after years of
neglect. See id. at 70-71. The Supreme Court roundly criticized the Richmond program
because, among other things, it included Alaskan Aleuts among the groups that were
eligible to participate in the program, and sought to ensure that at least thirty percent of
the city's construction funds went to minority contractors. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 478.
Yet, the definition of disadvantaged groups that the city used was taken directly from the
federal program that had been upheld by the Supreme Court in Fullilove, and the thirty
percent figure was chosen because it represented the midway point between the
percentage of contracts that currently were distributed to minority contractors and the
percent of the population that was African-American (sixty percent). See DRAKE &
HOLSWORTH, supra note 125, at 81-82. The plan was also adopted after the completion
of a study on minority participation in the construction industry. See id. at 82.
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from the fact that white voters rarely vote for African-American
candidates. 32 Some of this unwillingness has to do with the
pernicious legacy of governmentally imposed voting restrictions on
African Americans, which have direct and indirect effects that
continue to influence voting patterns. 133 But some of the animus,
though influenced by governmental action, is more clearly
attributable to personal beliefs and biases-simple prejudice.
Additional factors that may be relevant to the voting context, but that
do not directly implicate race, include the advantage incumbents have
in elections and financial advantages whites possess due to their
personal wealth and ability to attract funds. 34  Although the
government would seemingly have a strong and constitutionally
permissible incentive to eradicate discriminatory private beliefs,135 the
Court has been reluctant to consider racial redistricting as an
acceptable means of achieving that permissible goal. 36
Education likewise provides a complicated web of motives and
causal inquiries. No one would deny the government's role in
establishing and maintaining segregated schools, as well as the many
and diverse efforts school districts employed to avoid desegregation
mandates. 37 It is more difficult, however, to assess responsibility for
132. The phenomenon of racial bloc voting has been well-documented. See generally
QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-
1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994). In North Carolina, in 1982 and
1984, more than ninety percent of African Americans voted for the African-American
candidate in the two races when they had the opportunity to do so, while eighty-six to
eighty-eight percent of whites voted for a white candidate. See J. MORGAN KOUSSER,
COLORBLIND INJUsTIcE 273 (1999). In addition to racial bloc voting, lower voter
turnouts and registration among African Americans contributes to the difficulties black
candidates have had getting elected, as does the power of incumbency. See id. at 259-60
(discussing North Carolina elections).
133. See, e.g., ROY L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION? A STRATEGY OF
RACIAL EQUALITY 88-92 (1996) (discussing obstacles to ending racial bloc voting).
Pamela Karlan and Daryl Levinson have suggested that the role the state has played in
"creating and perpetuating racial bloc voting" should take these cases "out of the realm of
non-remedial 'societal discrimination.'" See Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why
Voting Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201,1232 n.153 (1996).
134. KOUSSER, supra note 132, at 258.
135. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,433 (1984) (invalidating a state policy on
child custody because it gave effect to private biases). The government can surely seek to
change even these private discriminatory beliefs, and has undertaken over the years
frequent if ineffective efforts, such as President Clinton's race initiative, which no one
would contend was unconstitutional.
136. See Melissa L. Saunders, Reconsidering Shaw: The Miranda of Race-Conscious
Districting, 109 YALE LJ. 1603,1604-07 (2000).
137. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968) (invalidating a
freedom-of-choice plan); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S.
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the failure to achieve any significant degree of desegregation since the
early 1970s, although much of that failure must lie at the feet of those
who so strongly resisted integration, including many public officials. 38
The primary difficulty in the desegregation cases, particularly those
that are still being litigated, is deciding who should bear the
responsibility for the fact that so many schools remain segregated. 39
In an insightful dissenting opinion, Justice Souter wondered aloud
how it was possible to know, or to determine, whether it was official
segregation or the efforts to eliminate segregation that had caused the
flight from inner-city schools, which in turn contributes to the severe
racial imbalance that still defines many urban schools today.4 ° It is
unquestionably difficult to answer this query, but the problem that
has arisen is that the Court has never asked the question let alone
tried to answer it.'4'
Housing offers a similar though surprisingly less well-known
story. We often treat housing as reflecting core private beliefs and
individual choice' 42 but the government has long been actively
218, 225-27 (1964) (finding that the closing of the public schools conflicted with the
Court's mandate in Brown).
138. See JAMES T. PATrERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 115-17 (2001) (discussing the important role
played by public officials' resistance to desegregation).
139. For a discussion of the current state of desegregation in public schools, see GARY
ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1-22 (1996). In an important recent
case, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the state had played a significant role in
the present segregation of Hartford's schools even though separate schools had not been
part of state policy for nearly a hundred years. See Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1274
(Conn. 1996). The Court held that the state had contributed to the current racial makeup
of the schools through the use of standardized tests, school attendance, graduation
requirements, the use of financial aid, and other means. Id. at 1273.
140. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,164 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
141. Others on the Court see it as unrealistic to believe that there are significant
lingering effects from the era of segregated schools. Justice Scalia has been most
forthright in stating such a position. He has written: "At some time, we must
acknowledge that it has become absurd to assume, without any further proof, that
violations of the Constitution dating from the days when Lyndon Johnson was President,
or earlier, continue to have an appreciable effect upon current operation of schools."
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,506 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
142. Many of the Court's more recent school desegregation cases reflect this sentiment,
expressed most clearly by Justice Thomas: "The continuing 'racial isolation' of schools
after de jure segregation has ended may well reflect voluntary housing choices or other
private decisions." Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 84 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Freeman, 503
U.S. at 495 (1991) (noting that demographics changes are often the real source of racial
imbalance, and "[i]t is beyond the authority and beyond the practical ability of the federal
courts to try to counteract"); Dowell v. Bd. of Educ., 778 F. Supp. 1144, 1167 (W.D. Okla.
1991) (finding, on remand from the Supreme Court, that "[c]urrent residential segregation
in Oklahoma City today is caused by the private choices of blacks and whites").
1610 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
involved in shaping those choices, often in discriminatory ways. For
example, following World War II, government efforts to assist in
expanding home ownership among returning veterans included
explicit directives to avoid lending to racially diverse areas.143
Additionally, the government has recently acknowledged the
discriminatory patterns in which it built public housing, which
effectively ensured that public housing perpetuated, rather than
alleviated, segregated housing patterns.'" The government also
helped shape housing choices by subsidizing the building of highways
to the suburbs rather than enhancing mass transit systems within the
cities, by permitting and often encouraging zoning laws that made it
difficult for lower income individuals to purchase or rent housing in
the suburbs, and by providing various tax incentives for companies to
relocate to the suburbs 45
This short history demonstrates that what the Court has labeled
societal discrimination is best defined as the product of cumulative
acts and forces, some of which directly involve the government and
others of which implicate the government more indirectly.146
143. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION
OF THE UNITED STATES 208 (1985). For a recent discussion of the ways in which the
government contributed to segregated housing, particularly in Boston, see Michelle
Adams, The Last Wave of Affirmative Action, 1998 WIs. L. REV. 1395, 1418-24.
144. See Walker v. City of Mesquite, 169 F.3d 973, 976-78 (5th Cir. 1999) (discussing
Dallas's discriminatory policy for locating public housing), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1131
(2000); Raso v. Lago, 135 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 1998) (involving Boston's public housing and
1991 consent decree concerning HUD's failure to ensure equal access to public housing
for minority residents).
145. See JACKSON, supra note 143, at 190-245; see also Richard Thompson Ford, The
Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841,
1847-60 (1994) (discussing the many ways in which public and private associations
contributed to racial segregation).
146. A third type of discrimination that might be associated with societal
discrimination is the cumulative force of practices that are specific to a particular
employer, what is sometimes referred to as institutional racism. See BARBARA J. FLAGG,
WAS BLIND, BUT Now I SEE: WHrTE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS & THE LAW 27-29 (1998);
Ian F. Haney L6pez, Institutional Racism" Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial
Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1726-28 (2000). Within this perspective, an employer
or entity's practices are tinged with biases in a variety of ways even though no particular
practice may be responsible in a legal sense for the discriminatory results. An employer,
for example, might use word-of-mouth recruiting, which will then be compounded by
subtle biases in the workplace, the combination of which will lead to sharply fewer
opportunities for minorities within the organization. L6pez discusses the judicial
appointment of grand jurors in Los Angeles County during the 1960s and 1970s, when
judges tended to appoint people with whom they were personally acquainted-a practice
that produced, not surprisingly, very few minority grand jurors. See L6pez, supra, at 1732-
43. In contrast to the first two types of discrimination I have discussed, this form of
discrimination primarily involves proof problems and I believe is not properly classified as
societal discrimination. Indeed, in employment discrimination, Title VII specifically
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Described in this way, societal discrimination is a social ill that the
government should be able to take steps to eliminate or reduce.
Indeed, not only should the government be permitted to remedy
societal discrimination, it should be obligated to do so. Because
societal discrimination serves no positive function, it is precisely the
kind of condition the government should be charged with remedying.
In the next two sections, I will suggest that it can do so through its
spending power.
II. THE SPENDING POWER
One way the government can meet its obligation to remedy
societal discrimination is through the use of its spending power, which
traditionally has afforded the government broad discretion to pursue
social, economic, and political goals.147 The government has long
sought to shape behavior by attaching various conditions to the
distribution of its funds. 48 These conditions have ranged widely, from
controlling agricultural production to restricting campaign spending,
and have included requirements that government contractors pay
prevailing wages to their employees, as well as more mundane issues
such as promoting sustainable agriculture through the sale of organic
coffee in government cafes. 149 When the government uses its funds to
pursue a particular political, social, or economic agenda, courts
provides for a proof structure to govern circumstances where discriminatory results are the
product of employment practices that are "not capable of separation." 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000g (1994). At the same time, these cases are extremely difficult to prove and
may often go unremedied for this reason, but this difficulty alone should not transform the
cases into a form of societal discrimination if the concept is to retain any significant
meaning.
147. The Spending Clause provides that "the Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
148. For a comprehensive review of the many cases in which the government has
attached conditions to federal spending, see Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal
Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103 (1987). Rosenthal's article was
written just before the Court issued a series of important decisions and thus is now better
read for its historical understanding than as an exegesis of existing doctrine.
149. See, e.g., Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841,
846 (1984) (denying federal assistance to students who had not registered for the draft);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (upholding federal legislation prohibiting the
use of medicaid funds for abortions); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,143 (1976) (per curiam)
(upholding spending restrictions on candidates who receive federal funds); United States
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-67 (1936) (noting that objectives not within Article I's
enumerated powers may be attained through the spending power).
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generally have reviewed the programs with considerable judicial
deference.15 °
The Supreme Court's doctrine relating to government funding is
both lengthy and complicated, and involves three discrete but related
areas. First, and for the purposes of my argument most important,
are a series of cases involving decisions by the government to fund
certain activities to the exclusion of others, cases that are often
treated under the general rubric of "government funding cases." ''
Second, some cases implicate what are known as "unconstitutional
conditions," where the government conditions a benefit on some
particular behavior, such as complying with a loyalty oath or
refraining from supporting political candidates as a price for federal
funds. 2 These cases are closely related to the first category, but a
separate doctrine has developed around the cases that is often-
mistakenly I contend-seen as a critical restraint on the government's
spending power.153 Third, the government uses its funds to provide
incentives to induce compliance with other legal provisions, for
example, by prohibiting entities that receive federal funds from
engaging in racial discrimination. 4 In this section, I concentrate my
analysis on the first two categories of cases, and I address the third
category in the final section of this Article.
From the outset, I should note that I will not attempt anything
like a comprehensive review of the Court's doctrine in this area but
instead concentrate on a series of cases involving the government's
role in various commercial activities, as opposed to situations in
which the government places various conditions or restrictions on
social welfare benefits, an area that raises an entirely different set of
150. One commentator has recently suggested that the Supreme Court might be
preparing for a shift in the near future, at least with respect to conditions imposed on
states. See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1911, 1924-32 (1995). Professor Baker has suggested that the Court might try to
reconcile its permissive stance toward government spending with the Court's far more
restrictive view of the federal government to dictate terms on states that interfere with
traditional state autonomy. Id. Since the publication of Professor Baker's article, the
Supreme Court has issued a series of decisions holding that individuals cannot sue states
for money damages under various federal antidiscrimination statutes, providing some
additional support for her argument. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,
91 (2000) (holding that the ADEA cannot be applied to the states).
151. See infra text accompanying notes 156-98.
152. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 372-73 (1984) (upholding a
prohibition on television stations that receive federal funds from supporting political
candidates); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528-29 (1958) (invalidating the loyalty oath).
These cases are discussed in more detail infra Part II.C.
153. I discuss the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in Part II.C.
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) (Title VI).
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issues that are not directly related to my argument. 55 In particular, I
focus on a spate of decisions the Court has issued in the last decade
upholding governmental efforts to fund a particular side in
controversial areas in pursuit of what the government defines as the
public good. I argue that these cases provide the necessary
constitutional space for the government to use its spending power to
seek to remedy societal discrimination, a goal the government may
only accomplish through indirect means tied to federal funding.
A. The Recent Government Funding Cases
1. Rust v. Sullivan
As it relates to the goal of remedying societal discrimination, the
most important case in this area is Rust v. Sullivan, in which the
Supreme Court upheld restrictions imposed on health clinics that
received federal funding designated for a specific programY.16  At
issue in Rust were Department of Health and Human Services
regulations that limited the ability of health providers receiving
federal funds through a program known as Title X to engage in
abortion-related activities. 157 The Title X program was introduced in
155. For an overview of the benefits cases, see Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights:
Toward A Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185
(1990). The literature involving government funding is enormous, especially in the area of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which holds a special appeal for constitutional
scholars. For a sampling of the principal works, see David E. Engdahl, The Spending
Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1 (1994); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-
Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of
Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989); William Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439
(1968).
156. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177-78 (1991). In many ways, Rust was an
extension of two earlier Supreme Court decisions that upheld state and federal
determinations that Medicaid funds could not be used to pay for most abortions. See
Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297,326-27 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,480 (1977). In
upholding the state decision, the Supreme Court specifically acknowledged the state's
latitude to use its funding to pursue permissible political goals, noting that there was "no
limitation on the authority of a state to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over
abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds." Maher, 432
U.S. at 474; see also Harris, 448 U.S. at 324-25 (upholding restrictions on access to
abortion for indigent women). Equally important, the abortion funding cases set the tone
for the Court's deferential review of government funding decisions by applying rationality
review to the government restrictions.
157. Rust, 500 U.S. at 179 ("[A] Title X project may not provide counseling concerning
the use of abortion as a method of family planning, or provide a referral for abortion as a
method of family planning.").
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the early 1970s to provide family planning to low-income women, and
the restrictions challenged in Rust were part of the Reagan
Administration's efforts to limit the scope of Title X funding to
"preventive family-planning" by "clarifying that pregnant women
must be referred to appropriate prenatal care services.' 158  These
restrictions went beyond prohibiting the provision of abortions at the
facilities, they also prevented employees of the clinics from discussing
abortion with their clients, or from referring them to abortion clinics
even when their clients specifically requested a referral.19
Given that the Supreme Court had twice previously upheld the
government's refusal to fund abortion services,"6 the constitutional
challenge in Rust centered on the prohibition relating to discussing
abortion within a Title X facility.'6 ' In their First Amendment
challenge, the petitioners, doctors and health clinics, argued that the
regulations constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination
because they were intended to suppress dangerous ideas, namely the
advocacy of abortion. 62 On one level, this argument appeared to be a
sure winner, as the regulations were indisputably viewpoint-based,
and the Supreme Court's speech doctrine is generally quite hostile to
viewpoint discrimination. 63 Indeed, had the restriction not been
attached to government funding, it would have been quickly
invalidated, as the government could not restrict the messages private
doctors and clinics could convey absent the connection to federal
funds. Yet, the Court rejected the petitioners' challenge and upheld
the regulation, explaining:
The Government can, without violating the Constitution,
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it
believes to be in the public interest ... . In so doing, the
Government has not discriminated on the basis of
viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the
exclusion of the other.' 64
158. Id.; see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of Knowledge,
61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587, 598-604 (1993) (discussing the history of the regulation).
159. Rust, 500 U.S. at 180 ("The Title X project is expressly prohibited from referring a
pregnant woman to an abortion provider, even upon specific request.").
160. See supra note 156.
161. In its opinion, the Court rejected two other challenges to the regulations as being
inconsistent with the legislation. Rust, 500 U.S. at 181-90.
162. Id. at 192.
163. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.").
164. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
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The Court added that the government was free to choose to advance
permissible goals when appropriating public funds and was under no
obligation to fund competing political or social views.16
In its opinion, the Court devoted sparse attention to the question
of what goals the government could legitimately pursue through the
use of its spending power. 66 In the abortion context, this would now
likely turn on whether the regulations constituted an undue burden
on a woman's ability to exercise her constitutionally protected right to
an abortion, a slightly different test than existed at the time Rust was
decided. 67 For example, the Court would likely find it impermissible
if the government required clients of Title X facilities to agree not to
have an abortion as a condition for using the facilities.' 8 Similarly,
the government could not apply its restrictions beyond the workplace
to prevent clinic employees from advocating abortions or counseling
individuals on their free time. Even with these restrictions, the
breadth of the Court's decision at times recalls Justice Holmes's
famous quip in a case involving the termination of a police officer that
although an officer "may have a constitutional right to talk politics...
165. In what now appears to be an anachronistic analogy, the Court noted that the
government may provide funds for the purpose of promoting democracy without
appropriating similar funds to support communism. Id at 194.
166. Robert Post has argued that the Court is likely to give the government greater
leeway when it is operating in what he defines as managerial domains where the "state
organizes its resources so as to achieve specified ends," which are often political in nature.
See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE LJ. 151, 164-65 (1996) [hereinafter
Post, Subsidized Speech]. Post contrasts the managerial domain with the domain of public
discourse where certain neutrality requirements restrict governmental actions to a greater
extent than they do in the managerial realm. See id. at 164; see also Robert C. Post,
Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1716-17 (1987) (developing his theory on the managerial and public
discourse domains). He notes further that "[w]ithin managerial domains ... ends may be
imposed upon persons." Post, Subsidized Speech, supra, at 164.
167. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884-85 (1992) (holding that a
statute that affects the right to abortion will be invalidated only if it imposes an "undue
burden" on women seeking abortions). The test devised in Casey was, in fact, quite
similar to the standard the Court used in its earlier decisions upholding the governments'
determination not to provide Medicaid funds for abortions. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 315 (1980) ("The Hyde Amendment... places no governmental obstacle in the path
of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy.").
168. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19 ("A substantial constitutional question would
arise if Congress had attempted to withhold all Medicaid benefits from an otherwise
eligible candidate simply because that candidate had exercised her constitutionally
protected freedom to terminate pregnancy by abortion."); Sullivan, supra note 155, at 1464
(stating that withholding funds from a woman who had an abortion would be
impermissible).
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he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." '169 But the Court's
decision in Rust does not go quite so far, and indeed the Court sought
to define some additional limits on the manner in which the
government disburses its funds.
As will be discussed in more detail below, the most significant
limitation on the government's ability to spend falls under what is
known as the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, where the
government seeks to impose conditions that may violate an
individual's constitutional rights. 70 Within its First Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court provides greater scrutiny of the
governmental efforts to restrict actions that occur in public fora,
where the government has a greater obligation to act neutrally than it
does when it is simply funding programs intended to further its
political agenda. 7  In deciding whether the government
impermissibly funds an activity, the Court considers the existence of
other outlets for the prohibited activity. In upholding the restriction
on abortion counseling, the Court placed substantial weight on the
fact that the Title X clinics could establish separate facilities to
provide abortion services so long as those facilities were both
financially and physically separate from the federally funded clinics.72
For the purposes of my argument, three aspects of the decision
are worth emphasizing. First, the Court did not subject the
regulations to its strict scrutiny, but instead applied what is best
169. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). Under this
view, because no entity or person is obligated to accept federal funds, there can be no
complaint regarding the particular strings that are attached to those funds, a view that has
attracted varying degrees of allegiance throughout the Court's history. Indeed, Justices
Rehnquist and Scalia seem to hold just such a view. See infra text accompanying note 216
(discussing the Justices' advocacy of applying rational basis review to governmental use
restrictions). For a critical analysis of this position, see Van Alstyne, supra note 155, at
1463-64.
170. See Part II.C infra.
171. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(discussing the government's obligations when public forum is at issue); Perry Ed. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (stating that government has a higher
degree of neutrality in a public forum setting).
172. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991) ("The Title X grantee can continue to
perform abortions, provide abortion-related services, and engage in abortion advocacy; it
is simply required to conduct those activities through programs that are separate and
independent from the project that receives Title X funds."). The Court was far less
concerned with whether establishing a separate facility was actually feasible or would
provide any practical services. Assuming the clinic was established to serve the same
women who would benefit from Title X funds, the women may never find out about the
separate facility given that the Title X clinic was prohibited from referring their clients to
an abortion provider. Similarly, the Title X recipient may not have sufficient additional
funds to establish a separate clinic.
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described as a rational basis review. 3 Under rationality review, the
only question the Court considers is whether the governmental
restriction is reasonably related to the program's goals, a test that is
widely acknowledged to be constitutionally undemanding. 4 Second,
the decision clearly establishes that the government-and this
principle should apply to federal, state, and local governments-can
regulate indirectly using public funds for purposes that it would not
be permitted to accomplish directly. Certainly the government could
not have prohibited the clinic employees from discussing abortion-
related services absent the provision of federal funds. Instead, under
its spending power, the government was able to pursue its objective of
ensuring that federal funds were not used to support or encourage
abortions. Third, there is nothing to suggest that the decision should
be limited to the abortion context. This is true even though the case
often reads like one of the Court's abortion decisions decided by a
bare majority led by the Court's most conservative members. Indeed,
although Rust has not been widely applied-and the regulations at
issue were rescinded shortly after President Clinton took office175-it
has been extended to other areas. 6
173. The Court did not specify the level of review it was applying, although it used
language that is often equated with rationality review, noting, for example, that the scope
of the project was "permissibly restricted" and that the regulations were "a permissible
construction." Id. at 199,203. The Court also relied on its earlier decisions in Maher and
Harris, both of which applied rationality review.
174. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,324-25 (1980) (applying rationality review
to uphold a regulation prohibiting medicaid funds to be used for abortions); DANIEL A.
FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD
CENTURY 294-97 (1993) (noting that the Court usually finds a way to uphold legislation
under rationality review).
175. See Post, Subsidized Speech, supra note 166, at 168 n.106.
176. In addition to the cases discussed infra, see Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217, 229 (2000) (involving distribution of funds by public university); Urofsky v.
Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 408 n.6 (4th Cir. 2000) (concerning state employee speech), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1070 (2001); Turley v. Police Dep't of the City of New York, 167 F.3d 757,
761 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that "the government can, without violating the Constitution,
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities"); Hassan v. Wright, 45 F.3d
1063, 1069 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Rust for the proposition that there is no affirmative right
to government aid). Just last term, the Supreme Court issued a decision that distinguished
Rust, in invalidating restrictions that had been placed on the litigation activities of the
Legal Services Corporation. See Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542-43
(2001). The Court found that the restrictions, which precluded litigation challenges to the
recently enacted Welfare Reform Act, were inconsistent with the purposes of the statute
and significantly interfered with the role of the judiciary in adjudicating the scope and
permissibility of the Act. Interestingly, while the Court distinguished Rust, it never cited
its decision in NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998), discussed infra.
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2. The NEA Controversy
An important case extending the principles discussed in Rust
involved Congress's attempt to impose limits on the distribution of
funds by the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) so as to ensure
that the agency's grants would respect general standards of decency.
In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, four artists whose
projects were approved by an advisory panel prior to the adoption of
the decency clause challenged the regulations after their proposals
were subsequently rejected as being inconsistent with standards of
decency.1 77 The plaintiffs argued that the regulation ran afoul of the
First Amendment because it sought to exclude particularly
controversial projects from eligibility for public funds.7 8
This case was both much easier and more difficult than Rust.
When it comes to funding for the arts, the government has wide
latitude to choose what projects it wants to fund, yet, at the same
time, the regulations were undeniably aimed at suppressing
controversial forms of speech, which is one of the core evils the First
Amendment seeks to protect against.179 Although the Government
has broad discretion to choose what paintings to hang in its museums,
or what projects it wants to subsidize, the controversy arose here
because it sought to limit its financial support based on the views
expressed by the artists rather than on the artistic merit of the
projects, a restriction that might be applied to limit support of art that
criticized the government.
In an opinion authored by Justice O'Connor, one of the
dissenters in Rust, the regulation was upheld for a variety of reasons,
but in particular because the Court determined that the government
was exercising its discretion to choose among permissible ways to
spend its funds.180 Justice O'Connor explained,
Although the First Amendment certainly has application in
the subsidy context, we note that the Government may
allocate competitive funding according to criteria that would
be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a
criminal penalty at stake. So long as legislation does not
177. 524 U.S. 569,577 (1998).
178. Id at 577-78.
179. See Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112
HARV. L. REv. 84, 104-06 (1998) (discussing the role of viewpoint discrimination in the
Court's analysis).
180. Finley, 524 U.S. at 587-88.
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infringe on other constitutionally protected rights, Congress
has wide latitude to set spending priorities.18'
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion would have gone even further
by largely exempting funding decisions from judicial scrutiny
altogether. Unlike the majority, Justice Scalia, who was joined by
Justice Thomas, conceded that the regulation constituted viewpoint
discrimination but considered it constitutional nevertheless, observing
that "[i]t is the very business of government to favor and disfavor
points of view on ... innumerable subjects."'182 This case was
particularly easy for Justice Scalia insofar as "[t]hose who wish to
create indecent and disrespectful art are as unconstrained now as they
were before the enactment of this statute.... [T]hey are merely
deprived of the additional satisfaction of having the bourgeoisie taxed
to pay for it."''
Writing only for himself, Justice Souter made a compelling case
in dissent that Finley was a more difficult case than the majority's
decision intimated. Justice Souter emphasized that unlike Rust, the
Finley case did not involve the government's role as a speaker but
instead involved the government's expenditure of funds to support an
important public purpose.184 There was no danger, he suggested, that
the art supported by NEA grants would be construed as government
art projects, which arguably distinguished the situation from the
health clinics at issue in Rust where the Title X money plainly funded
a government program 8 5 When the government merely funds only a
portion of a project, viewpoint discrimination becomes more
problematic. "After all," Justice Souter wrote, "the whole point of
the proviso was to make sure that works like Serrano's ostensibly
blasphemous portrayal of Jesus would not be funded, while a reverent
treatment conventionally respectful of Christian sensibilities, would
not run afoul of the law. Nothing could be more viewpoint based
than that.' '186
If taken to an extreme, the Court's decision in Finley might be
used to support withholding funds from art that was unpatriotic or
racist, and the decision does not suggest what constitutional limits
might apply to such restrictions. But there do appear to be some
limits, at least implicitly. For example, it seems quite likely that the
181. Id.
182. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 595-96 (Scalia, J., concurring).
184. Id at 611 (Souter, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 611-12 (Souter, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 606 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Court would invalidate grants that were distributed only to
Republican artists, though it might be able to support Republican-
inspired art. And without some substantial justification it would
likely invalidate a grant program that sought to direct funds solely to
African-American artists. On the other hand, the government might
be able to withhold funds from racist art under the theory that it does
not want to support discrimination or discriminatory messages of any
kind; it may also be able to dedicate funds to promoting African-
American art based on its message or past neglect.' 7 This distinction
between funding artists and art will ultimately play an important role
in determining how the government can use its funds to pursue the
goal of racial equality.
3. The Rosenberger Case
Justice Souter based his argument in Finley primarily on a case
that had been decided between Rust and Finley involving the
distribution of student funds at the University of Virginia. In
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, the
Court struck down the University's refusal to distribute funds
obtained from student fees to religious groups.' s  But the
Rosenberger case ultimately proves to be an inapt analogy, as the case
is more about religion than it is about government funding.189 The
program at issue in Rosenberger provided student funds to qualifying
student groups but excluded religious-as well as philosophical,
political, and several other groups-from receiving funds, ostensibly
due to a fear that providing the funds to the religious groups would
violate the Establishment Clause.' ° There was no other stated reason
for the restriction, 91 and once the Supreme Court held that the
Establishment Clause would not be violated by including religious
groups among the groups eligible to receive funds there was no
credible rationale for the continued restriction. As a result, the
University's restriction appeared to result from a desire to disfavor
187. See Kreimer, supra note 155, at 1338-39, 1374-75 (discussing grants based on
political affiliation).
188. 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995).
189. The case also implicates the Court's doctrine relating to public fora, where the
government must exercise more care and less discretion in how it distributes its resources.
See id. at 829 (discussing the limited public forum).
190. Id. at 824-25.
191. In the Supreme Court, the university largely abandoned its Establishment Clause
argument in favor of arguing that it should be able to "control the use of its public funds."
Id at 838. No Justice on the Court appeared to take this move seriously, and they all
concentrated on the Establishment Clause argument. See id.
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religious groups, which amounted to impermissible viewpoint
discrimination that was plainly inconsistent with the First
Amendment's command of government neutrality toward religion. 192
The Court in Rosenberger sought to distinguish Rust by
emphasizing the different roles the government played in the two
cases. In Rust, the government "used private speakers to transmit
specific information pertaining to its own program," whereas the
program at issue in Rosenberger simply facilitated the speech of third
parties.19' It is this language that Justice Souter seized upon in his
dissenting opinion in Finley. If taken literally, the government's role
as speaker would be critical to determining the constitutionality of a
government subsidy program, and this distinction arguably should
have produced a different result in Finley, where the government
sought to facilitate the arts but was not acting as a speaker. That said,
whatever role the government-as-speaker distinction actually plays in
the Court's doctrine, it is not likely to be relevant in the
discrimination context where the government can structure its
program, and in some instances already has, to support a particular
purpose and thereby to send a particular message.
That Rosenberger was primarily about religion rather than
government funding was confirmed in a more recent decision in
which the Court upheld the University of Wisconsin's mandatory
student fee program over the complaint of students who objected to
some of the purposes to which the funds were put. 94 Writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice Kennedy reiterated the core meaning of
Rust by noting, "When the government speaks, for instance to
promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the
end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its
advocacy."'195 The Court noted further that when the government
speaks, the issue of viewpoint neutrality does not "come into play."' 96
192. Id at 832-35 (holding that the statute was impermissibly viewpoint based). In
reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court principally relied on a religion case, Lamb's
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395-96 (1993), which struck
down an effort to prohibit religious groups from using school facilities that were otherwise
open to the community.
193. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833-34; see also Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S.
533, 542 (2001) (noting that "the LSC program was designed to facilitate private speech,
not to promote a governmental message").
194. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,233-34 (2000).
195. Id at 235.
196. See id.; see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 121 S. Ct. 2093 (2001)
(relying on Rosenberger to invalidate a restriction on the use of public schools by religious
groups); Gentala v. City of Tucson, 244 F.3d 1065, 1074-78 (9th Cir. 2001) (en bane)
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The Court's concern with religion in Rosenberger offers guidance
on the limitations that are likely to be imposed on the government's
efforts to remedy societal discrimination through the spending power.
Just as the government cannot exclude religious groups from its
general publication funds, the government cannot exclude groups
based solely on race when it is exercising its spending powers.197 Put
more simply, the government could no more exclude whites from its
contracting program than a state university could exclude religious
groups from receiving state funds. But there the religion analogy
stops because the First Amendment prohibits the government from
promoting religion in a way that the government is not prohibited
from promoting racial equality, an issue that will be analyzed
shortly.1 9
B. Government Spending in Other Contexts
The cases just discussed are all broadly consistent with a diverse
line of cases regulating the government's proprietary activities. The
Court has held, for example, that the government can restrict its
employees' speech rights in the workplace with respect to speech that
does not involve matters of public concern. 199 The Court has likewise
(applying Rosenberger to city funding of a religious activity), vacated by 122 S. Ct. 340
(2001).
197. For a recent argument comparing the Court's doctrine relating to religion and
race, see Mary Anne Case, Lessons for the Future of Affirmative Action from the Past of
the Religion Clauses, 2000 SUP. Cr. REv. 325,326-27.
198. The cases just discussed, particularly Rust and Finley, have elicited stern critical
commentary from academics, in large part because the causes promoted in the cases were
generally conservative in nature and, as a result, these cases have generally been treated as
part of the Court's reactionary political doctrine. For two recent critical reviews of the
Court's doctrine, see Steven J. Heyman, State-Supported Speech, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1119,
1121-22; Post, Subsidized Speech, supra note 166, at 151-52. For additional critiques of
Rust v. Sullivan, see David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of
Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675, 682-83 (1992) (arguing
that the Court's version of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is deficient); Christina
E. Wells, Abortion Counseling as Vice Activity: The Free Speech Implications of Rust v.
Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 COLuM. L. REv. 1724, 1726 (1995)
(discussing the First Amendment implications of restricting abortion counseling). While I
address this issue later in this Article, let me note here that the road to conditional
spending need not be a one-way street, as both liberal and conservative governments can
attach conditions to their spending.
199. When a government employee is disciplined for speech that involves a matter of
public concern, the Court applies a balancing test to determine whether the government
was justified in its belief that the speech would interfere with the efficient operation of its
business. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987). Where the speech does not
implicate a matter of public concern, there is no First Amendment restriction on the




freed the government from the constraints of the Commerce Clause
when it acts as a participant, or purchaser, in a market as distinct from
when it is operating in its role as a market regulator.2 ° The federal
government has also required states to establish a nationwide speed
limit and to set a drinking age as a condition for receiving federal
highway funds, two goals the government would likely lack the power
to accomplish absent its spending power.20 1 In these cases, once the
government ties the conditions to government funds, the Court's
review has been exceedingly deferential, and the programs are
routinely upheld.
1. South Dakota v. Dole
The leading case in this area is South Dakota v. Dole, where the
Supreme Court upheld Congress's decision to withhold a portion of
federal highway funds from states that maintained a drinking age
under twenty-one.2 2  Quoting from the Court's earlier decision in
Fullilove v. Klutznick,20 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: "Congress
may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, and has
repeatedly employed the power 'to further broad policy objectives by
conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the
recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives.' "204 If
South Dakota wanted to keep its drinking age at nineteen, all it was
required to do was forego some of its allotted federal highway
funds.205
Yet, Congress was not entirely free to impose conditions on its
funds, and much as it sought to do in Rust v. Sullivan,2° the Court
established four broad limitations on the government's spending
power. First, the spending had to be in pursuit of the general welfare,
and the condition had to be stated unambiguously to provide
adequate notice to fund recipients.2 Additionally, the condition had
200. See S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 (1984) ("Our cases
make clear that if a State is acting as a market participant, rather than as a market
regulator, the dormant Commerce Clause places no limitation on its activities.").
201. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (upholding federal highway
funds tied to national drinking age); Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 446 (9th Cir. 1989)
(upholding legislation withholding federal funds from states that did not impose a fifty-five
mile-per-hour speed limit).
202. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
203. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
204. Dole, 483 U.S. at 206 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 474).
205. See id. at 211 (noting that "all South Dakota would lose if she adheres to her
chosen course as to a suitable minimum drinking age is 5% of the funds").
206. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
207. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
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to be related in some degree to the projects for which the funds were
to be used, and could not violate other constitutional provisions, such
as if the government sought to require states to inflict cruel and
unusual punishment as a condition for receiving federal funds.208
None of these limitations, however, stands as a significant barrier to
conditional funding. The first two conditions-the pursuit of the
general welfare, stated unambiguously-are easily satisfied, and the
fourth condition essentially restates the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, an issue that will be discussed in more depth shortly. 9 The
Court has likewise failed to treat the third condition-on the relation
between the conditions and the underlying project-with anything
other than a deferential eye.2 a0
Finally, the Court suggested that some conditions might be so
coercive as to result in an impermissible level of compulsion, though
the Court failed to indicate when such a circumstance might arise.2"
Given that only five percent of federal highway funds were being
withheld, it was relatively easy to find a lack of coercion in the South
Dakota case, but it is also difficult to know how withholding a higher
percentage of highway funds might amount to compulsion. After all,
Rust involved withholding one hundred percent of the federal
government's Title X funds from facilities that encouraged abortions,
and the Court never even discussed the possibility that the program
was coercive in nature.212
2. The Patronage Cases
An area where the Court has more closely reviewed
governmental actions, and one that ultimately offers the best analogy
for the limitations that should guide governmental efforts designed to
208. Id at 207-08.
209. See infra Part II.C.
210. This point was highlighted by Justice O'Connor in her dissenting opinion, as she
noted that there was no clear link to having a national drinking age and providing federal
highway funds. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 214 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Professor Baker has
suggested that the Court adopt Justice O'Connor's more restrictive approach so as to align
the spending power decisions with the Court's more recent state sovereignty cases. See
Baker, supra note 150, at 1962-63.
211. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 ("Our decisions have recognized that in some circumstances
the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at
which 'pressure turns into compulsion.' ") (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548,590 (1937)).
212. The government's legislation mandating a fifty-five miles-per-hour speed limit
withheld ninety-five percent of federal funds from noncomplying states but was
nevertheless upheld. See Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 454 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding
that the possibility of coercion did not affect the outcome of the case).
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remedy societal discrimination, involves various patronage practices
exercised by political officeholders. Patronage practices have a long
history as a traditional means of distributing governmental largesse.
Yet in a consistent line of cases over the last twenty-five years, the
Court has restricted patronage practices to the jobs in which political
affiliation is determined to be important to the functioning of the
position 13 With only a few exceptions, the Court has stated that an
individual's political affiliation, which is treated as existing at the core
of the First Amendment, should not determine whether a government
employee is able to retain or secure a government job or contract.2 14
Importantly, this prohibition does not stem from either history or
constitutional text, as patronage practices have long been a part of
politics, and it was not until the Court stepped up its review in the
1970s that the practices were thrown into constitutional doubt.21 5
Rather, the Court's focus has been on insulating individuals from
political pressures in their employment, pressures the Court identifies
as inimical to justice and fairness in modem employment practices.
The political patronage cases have notably raised the ire of
Justices Scalia and Rehnquist, the two most avid supporters of the
government's discretionary spending power. These Justices, who are
occasionally joined in their opinions by other conservative Justices,
would apply a lenient rational basis review to restrictions applied to
governmental employment practices, 21 6 a fact that may indicate their
213. See Rutan v. Republican Party of fll., 497 U.S. 62, 78 (1990) ("Under our
sustained precedent, conditioning hiring decisions on political belief and association
plainly constitutes an unconstitutional condition, unless the government has a vital interest
in doing so."); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980) (holding that the government can
take account of political affiliation only when "party affiliation is an appropriate
requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved"). For an
overview of the patronage cases, see Cynthia Grant Bowman, The Law of Patronage at a
Crossroads, 12 J.L. & POL. 341 (1996).
214. See O'Hare v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 714-15 (1996) (applying political
affiliation cases to independent contractors); Rutan, 497 U.S. at 80 (restricting patronage
practices in promotions and transfers); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 372 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (restricting elected Sheriff's ability to replace sheriff deputies based on party
affiliation); see also United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477
(1995) (invalidating a government ban on honoraria for speeches and publications by
government employees).
215. The history and importance of political patronage is detailed in Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion in Rutan, 497 U.S. at 104-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 98 ("When dealing with its own employees, the government may not act in a
manner that is 'patently arbitrary or discriminatory,' but its regulations are valid if they
bear a 'rational connection' to the governmental end sought to be served.") (citations
omitted). Justice Scalia, generally joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, has dissented from
all of the government patronage cases decided during his tenure on the Court. See, e.g.,
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potential receptivity to allowing the government to use its funds to
remedy societal discrimination. But this line of cases again provides
some indication of the limits on the government's powers, just as the
patronage cases provide a bright line rule to protect important
political concepts embodied in the First Amendment. I will suggest
that a similar principle should direct the courts' analysis of
governmental efforts to remedy societal discrimination.
C. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
As we have seen, the government's discretion to use its spending
power is exceptionally broad, though not unlimited. The government
funding cases suggest that the primary restriction on the
government's ability to use its spending power involves what is known
as the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, a doctrine that prohibits
the government from requiring individuals, or entities, to forego or
violate constitutional rights in order to receive federal funds.217 The
doctrine, which has been applied most vigorously in the First
Amendment context, has been the subject of a torrent of scholarly
criticism and has been aptly described by various commentators as
either incoherent, insignificant, or both.218 To give but one example
of the doctrine's incoherency, all of the cases already discussed-
especially Rust and Finley-could be classified as unconstitutional
conditions cases, insofar as the challenge in each of the cases was
premised on a purported constitutional violation. Indeed, in both
Rust and Finley the unconstitutional conditions doctrine was raised
explicitly either in the Court's opinion or in the parties' briefs, though
ultimately the doctrine played no significant role in the Court's
determination.2 These cases are consistent with the way in which
the doctrine typically operates, and it is perhaps best to define the
doctrine as derivative of the government's spending power with a
O'Hare, 518 U.S. at 726 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S.
at 489 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
217. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5.6 (3d ed.
2000).
218. For two forceful arguments that the doctrine is ultimately incoherent, see
Frederick Schauer, Too Hard- Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of
Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REv. 989, 1005 (1995) (arguing that the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is not amenable to doctrinal reconciliation); Cass R.
Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (With
Particular Reference to Religion, Speech and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REv. 593, 620-21
(1990) (arguing that the doctrine should be abandoned).
219. This was particularly true in Finley, where the Court failed to even discuss the
doctrine. See Schauer, supra note 179, at 104 ("That the principle of unconstitutional
conditions is not so much as mentioned in... Finley is less an oversight than an epitaph.").
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limited scope that rarely serves as a serious impediment to
governmental action, particularly in recent years.'2  A review of
several of the paradigmatic unconstitutional conditions cases will
demonstrate that the doctrine's restraint offers little beyond the
Court's underlying constitutional doctrine.
The modem unconstitutional conditions doctrine is often traced
to the McCarthy era case, Speiser v. Randall, 1 where the Supreme
Court invalidated a California statute that required veterans to
execute a loyalty oath in order to qualify for a property-tax
exemption. 22  This case is said to illustrate the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine insofar as it held that the state could not require a
loyalty oath as a condition for receiving a property-tax exemptionpm
This interpretation, however, misreads an important aspect of the
case. While the Supreme Court spoke broadly in Speiser in a manner
that has since been associated with the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, the decision was actually based on the statute's inadequate
procedural safeguards. In particular, the Court was troubled by the
fact that the burden of proof to establish fidelity to the oath fell on
the person seeking the exemption. 4 The Court devoted little more
220. Based on this understanding, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is analogous
to the common law employment-at-will principle. The employment-at-will principle is
often stated broadly, implying that an employer is free to fire an employee for any reason
or no reason at all. Historically, the broadly stated rule had more resonance, but even
then it was often circumscribed by various other legal obligations. See MARK A.
RoTHsTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.1, at 226-28 (2d ed. 1999). Today this broad
version of the rule is inaccurate; a more accurate rendition would be that an employer is
free to fire an employee for any reason or no reason so long as the employer's action does
not violate some other governing legal rule, such as a statute or constitutional provision.
Understood in this fashion, the employment-at-will rule provides a background
understanding so that there is no independent restraint on an employer's business
decision, although the employer must comply with other applicable legal strictures. The
unconstitutional conditions doctrine works in the same manner: while the concept itself
has no independent content, the government must comply with other constitutional
provisions.
221. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
222. Id. at 528-29.
223. Nearly every survey of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine begins with a
discussion of Speiser v. Randall. See, e.g., Heyman, supra note 198, at 1124 (discussing
Speiser).
224. In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Court held:
[W]hen the constitutional right to speak is sought to be deterred by a State's
general taxing program due process demands that the speech be unencumbered
until the State comes forward with sufficient proof to justify its inhibition ....
[T]hough the validity of § 19 of Art. XX of the State Constitution be conceded
arguendo, its enforcement through procedures which place the burdens of proof
and persuasion on the taxpayer is a violation of due process.
Speiser, 357 U.S. at 528-29.
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than a single sentence to the question whether the government could
condition a privilege on the loyalty oath, and instead considered the
statute under the particular law that had developed regarding loyalty
oaths and political speech more generally.Y Indeed, the Speiser case
was complicated by the fact that the Supreme Court had previously
upheld several loyalty oaths for government and union jobs. 6 What
was different about the statute considered in Speiser was the burden
imposed on those seeking the exemption, rather than the oath itself.
As a result, what the individuals were actually giving up were
procedural protections incident to their First Amendment rights
rather than the rights themselves.217
More recently, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine was
invoked in the case of FCC v. League of Women Votersms when the
government sought to prohibit public broadcasting stations that
received federal funds from offering editorials or supporting political
candidates 9 Although the Court upheld the ban against supporting
political candidates without significant discussion,10 it invalidated the
editorial proscription because, according to the Court, it was not
narrowly tailored to support the asserted interest of protecting the
stations from becoming beholden to the government. 1 Additionally,
the Court found that because the restriction was not limited to the use
of federal funds, which provided only a small portion of the stations'
budgets, it was unnecessarily overbroad, extending to the very heart
of the First Amendment's protection of political speech. 2
Like Speiser, the League of Women Voters case does not present
a substantial limitation on the government's use of funds given that
the case was decided under the Court's First Amendment doctrine as
225. Id at 529.
226. Although loyalty oaths are often treated as anathema to the First Amendment,
the Supreme Court has upheld many such oaths, and most government employees are still
administered such an oath today. See Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 686-87 (1972)
(upholding a Massachusetts loyalty oath and reviewing existing doctrine).
227. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 531.
228. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
229. Id at 366.
230. Id at 382.
231. Id at 398. The government's rationale used to justify the statute was quite
peculiar and difficult for the Court to sustain under any substantive form of review. The
government argued that the ban on editorials was necessary so that the stations would not
seek to curry favor with the government that doled out the funds, suggesting that the
stations might be too prone to praise the government in order to obtain federal funds. Id.
at 384-85. Given that the government rarely seems concerned about receiving too much
positive press, this noble objective, which clearly could have been met through less
restrictive means, was difficult to take seriously. See id. at 392-93.
232. Id. at 393-95.
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applied to broadcasting, rather than on the government's ability to
use its federal funds. This was a point underscored by Justice
Rehnquist's strong dissenting opinion, which would have upheld the
restriction as rationally related to the government's stated
objective733 And like Speiser, this case directly suppressed speech
and therefore presented a particularly strong case for judicial
invalidation. In contrast, the Court has upheld a prohibition on
lobbying by tax-exempt organizations under the theory that the
government was under no obligation to subsidize lobbying.4 On the
surface, this case appears quite similar to the government's ban on
editorializing invalidated in League of Women Voters, but a majority
of the Court distinguished the two situations by noting that the tax-
exempt organizations were free to establish separate non-tax-exempt
entities to conduct their lobbying, whereas it was practically infeasible
for broadcast stations to create separate stations to pursue their
editorial interestsP15
There are a number of additional cases that would demonstrate
the limited utility of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,26 but
these two paradigmatic cases offer significant insight into just how
limited the doctrine actually is. Both Speiser and the League of
Women Voters cases were decided under the Court's applicable First
Amendment doctrine and received no particular assistance from the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. In other words, these are First
Amendment cases, not unconstitutional conditions cases, and there is
little to be gained by referring to the doctrine in search of particular
233. See id. at 406-07 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Cass Sunstein has previously argued
that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine rarely adds anything to the Court's existing
jurisprudence, particularly in the First Amendment context. See Sunstein, supra note 218,
at 606 ("A welfare program limited to Democrats is unconstitutional because of the First
Amendment .... Courts do not need an unconstitutional conditions doctrine in order to
make the necessary response.").
234. Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) (noting that
"Congress has merely refused to pay for the lobbying out of public moneys").
235. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400 ("[fln contrast to the appellee in
Taxation With Representation, such a station is not able to segregate its activities according
to the source of its funding.").
236. Another case that is routinely treated as raising concerns under the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine lends itself to a similar analysis. In Arkansas Writers'
Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987), the Supreme Court struck down an Arkansas tax
that applied to general interest magazines but not to newspapers or religious and sports
magazines. Id. at 234. The tax, which apparently applied to only three periodicals in the
state, was invalidated under what the Court referred to as its doctrine relating to "taxation
of the press." l at 228. This case gives credence to Fred Schauer's claim that the Court
is increasingly moving toward an institutionally specific First Amendment doctrine. See
Schauer, supra note 179, at 118-20.
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content.z 7  Moreover, the Court's concern with what might be
described as unconstitutional conditions appears most robust when
the governmental restrictions extend beyond the purposes of the
funds. For example, the Court would almost certainly invalidate a
statute that prohibited artists who received federal grants from
creating indecent art, just as the Court would invalidate a statute that
prohibited individuals who worked for clinics that received Title X
funds from advocating abortion outside of the clinic's work. The
Court has likewise protected government employees' political
affiliations and speech rights outside of the workplace where the
government's interest in the use of its funds is far more tenuous.23s
Together the government funding cases, in conjunction with the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, provide the government with
substantial latitude to shape social and economic policy through its
spending power. The question that remains is whether an argument
can be crafted from these cases that would allow the government to
take greater measures to remedy societal discrimination than the
Court has previously permitted, an issue explored in the next section.
III. THE SPENDING POWER AS APPLIED TO RACE
The government funding cases indicate that the government can
require more of its fund recipients than the Constitution would
otherwise require so long as the conditions are consistent with
relevant constitutional strictures. As a practical matter, these cases
suggest that the primary proscription on the government's use of
funds to further racial equality will lie in the Equal Protection Clause,
which to date has provided the primary barrier to government efforts
to remedy societal discriminationP 9 Yet, the government funding
cases, particularly Rust v. Sullivan,241 likewise suggest that when the
government chooses to subsidize activities or chooses to fund one side
of a particular controversial issue, the government's action is freed
from the typically fatal constraints of the Court's strict scrutiny and is
instead subject to a form of rational basis review, under which most
237. See Sunstein, supra note 218, at 612-18.
238. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477
(1995) (invalidating a government ban on honoraria for speeches and publications of
government employees).
239. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920-28 (1995) (finding that a Georgia district
violated the Equal Protection Clause); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
507-08 (1989) (invalidating a contract set-aside program on equal protection grounds);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,284 (1986) (invalidating a layoff plan).
240. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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programs are upheld.2 41 We also saw that in the contract set-aside
cases, the standard of review frequently proved critical to determining
the outcome when the government sought to take affirmative
measures to remedy societal discrimination: strict review proved
fatal, while an intermediate review offered more room for remedial
governmental efforts. 242
In this section, I argue that the government funding cases permit
the government to take efforts to remedy societal discrimination, so
long as the efforts do not rely on race-specific quotas. To illustrate
this point, I discuss how the funding cases impact contract set-aside
programs, and how those programs might be reconfigured so as to
survive the Court's review under the government's spending power
even where there is no demonstrated history of discrimination by the
particular governmental entity. More specifically, I contend that by
restructuring the programs to focus on the diversity of the workforce
rather than the race of the owners, and by tying the programs to the
government's spending power, courts should uphold the programs
under a rational basis review. I also argue that the funding cases can
help sustain existing government programs and provide the means by
which the government can require federal contractors to remedy
practices that have a disparate effect under various spending
initiatives, including Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Accordingly, although the government funding cases do not free
government programs from judicial scrutiny, they do offer a means by
which certain racially-motivated programs can be sustained that
would otherwise be invalidated. At the same time, it is important to
note that the funding cases provide an imperfect fit for analyzing the
programs, in large part because the affirmative action doctrine has
developed wholly independent of the government funding line of
cases and the Court's antidiscrimination doctrine tends to operate
within rigidly defined categories.243 I therefore argue here by analogy
rather than doctrinally.244
241. See supra text accompanying notes 173-74.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64,87-102.
243. For an engaging discussion regarding the limits of the Court's doctrine as applied
to racial profiling, see Brown v. City of Oneonta, 235 F.3d 769, 779 (2d Cir. 2000)
(Calabresi, J., dissenting from denial of en banc review).
244. As noted earlier, only Fullilove mentioned the government's spending power,
though the case was not decided on that basis alone, and Justice O'Connor obliquely
alluded to the city's spending power in her Croson opinion. See supra text accompanying
notes 62, 93.
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A. The Contract Set-Asides
1. Existing Set-Aside Programs and Government Spending
As a prerequisite to analyzing efforts to remedy societal
discrimination under the government funding cases, it is first
necessary to establish that these cases are relevant in the race
discrimination context, and here Rust v. Sullivan provides the best
analogy. It is by now accepted constitutional mantra that race is
different from other constitutional matters,245 and this principle might
suggest that the funding cases are inapposite when the government
seeks to use its spending power on matters involving race. Yet, as a
constitutional matter, race is more similar to abortion than it is
different, and there is no particular reason the Court's rationale in the
funding cases should not be extended to racially motivated funding
conditions. Outside of the context of government funds, abortion is
treated as implicating the fundamental right to privacy that arises
from the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and regulations on abortion have always been subject
to a form of strict scrutiny-the same level of scrutiny that applies in
the race discrimination context2 46 Although the two tests differ
somewhat, the important principle here is that government funding
decisions that implicate abortion are not subject to the Court's strict
scrutiny, even though direct regulation of abortion would be. This
became clear when the Court upheld governmental determinations
not to use Medicaid funds to pay for medically necessary abortions,247
a restriction that would not have survived the Court's strict level of
review.248
The case for advancing racial equality through the government's
spending power is, in fact, much stronger than a desire by the
government to promote a distinctive view on abortion. Arguably,
under the Constitution, the government should remain neutral with
245. See sources cited in supra note 13.
246. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-79 (1992).
247. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 324 (1980) (applying rationality review to
federal legislation prohibiting use of Medicaid funds for abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464,477 (1977) (upholding state regulation that refused to allow Medicaid funds to be
used for abortions, and noting that "[w]e think it abundantly clear that a State is not
required to show a compelling interest for its policy choice").
248. Denying poor women the right to obtain a constitutionally protected procedure as
a way of pursuing a legitimate governmental objective would not likely be defined as rising
to the level of a compelling interest. Surely the government cannot have a compelling
interest in denying low-income women their fundamental rights, though it might be
rational if the government opts not to pay for such procedures.
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respect to abortion, and certainly nothing in the Constitution would
compel the government to take a particular side in the abortion
debate.24 9 The same is not true with racial equality. In this context,
the government is commanded to take sides, a principle the Supreme
Court has reaffirmed on many occasions 0 ° The government has a
constitutional duty to eradicate discrimination and to refrain from
participating in the private manifestation of racial bias, and its
mandate extends far beyond a claim of neutrality on racial
discriminationl' This mandate extends to all forms of
discrimination, not just those caused directly by the government. Nor
is it limited to forms of intentional discrimination but it includes
discrimination that manifests itself in the form of adverse racial
effects or societal discrimination. 2
This does not mean, however, that the government can use its
funds to pursue racial equality in an unrestricted manner or that a
court should always defer to the government's political decisions
relating to discrimination so long as they are tied to the spending
power. As noted earlier, the Equal Protection Clause still stands as a
barrier to governmental funding decisions, but it is an Equal
Protection Clause that should be interpreted outside of the realm of
strict scrutiny. What this means as a practical matter is more difficult
to say, as indicated by the discussion of the unconstitutional
conditions and governmental funding cases, where no clear doctrinal
principle has emerged despite the extensive volume of cases and
scholarly literature.253
249. This is true with the caveat that the government is commanded under current
doctrine not to establish what amounts to an undue burden on women's right to exercise
their fundamental right to an abortion. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884-85.
250. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599 (1983) (upholding
the IRS's decision to deny tax exemption to racially discriminatory schools); Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973) ("[A]lthough the Constitution does not proscribe
private bias, it places no value on discrimination.").
251. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989) (holding that
the government can seek to remedy its own participation in discrimination); Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (holding that private "biases may be outside the reach of
the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect"); Norwood, 413 U.S. at
465 ("[lIt is ... axiomatic that a state may not induce, encourage, or promote private
persons to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.").
252. This can be seen in the government's interpretation of Title VI, which prohibits
discrimination by federal contractors and has been interpreted to include a disparate
impact component. The statute is discussed infra, Part III.B.1.
253. Erwin Chemerinsky makes this point nicely in a lecture delivered at the
Cleveland-Marshall Law School regarding governmental content-based choices. See
Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment: When the Government Must Make Content-
Based Choices, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 199,200 (1994). Chemerinsky writes:
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My own reading of the doctrine is that the political patronage
cases provide the best analogy for how the Court ought to analyze
governmental spending programs that are intended to remedy
societal discrimination. In the political patronage cases, the Court has
drawn a blunt line prohibiting the hiring of all but high-level officials
based on their political affiliation, and it has done so not because of
either history or constitutional text, but because it seems inimical to
the Court that ordinary employment decisions should turn on a
person's political affiliation. 4 By the same measure, there seems to
be widespread agreement that the government could not award
government funds-whether for contracts, the arts, or any other
matter-based on political affiliation, for example, by funding only
Republican contractors or artists, just as they could not restrict funds
for abortions to Republican or Democratic women.'
This same analysis should apply in the area of awarding contracts
or providing government funds on the basis of race. The government
clearly cannot provide funds only to African-American or to white
contractors, absent proof that the funds were being used as a remedial
tool to address identified discrimination. This principle arises from
the Court's current antidiscrimination doctrine,26 and this part of the
doctrine would not be altered by incorporating the government
funding cases into the analysis. The same would be true with respect
to the Court's doctrine prohibiting racial quotas, a principle the Court
has restated consistently and frequently2 7 Although the Court has
never strictly applied a "colorblind" interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment outside of several remedial programs where the
defendant's discrimination had been well-documented,258 the Court
Increasingly, I came to see that some of the hardest First Amendment issues, the
ones most dividing lower courts and perplexing commentators involved instances
in which the government had to make content-based choices. The more I looked
the more cases and examples I found. Yet, as I read the cases, I found the
analysis terribly unsatisfying. All used traditional First Amendment principles
and they seemed of little help.
Id at 200-01.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 214-15.
255. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 7, at 38-40 (discussing various restrictions on the
government's power to shape social and political life).
256. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 509-10 (concluding that the government must make
specific findings of discriminatory practices before attempting to remedy such practices).
257. See Selmi, supra note 110, at 344-46.
258. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166-67 (1987) (upholding a one-black-
for-one-white promotion requirement); Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v.
EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 440-42 (1986) (affirming a requirement that the union establish a
twenty-nine percent nonwhite membership goal). The Court has also upheld a voluntary
affirmative action plan where the clear racial disparities in hiring had not been attributed
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has never upheld a quota tied to race and it has expressed great
hostility to the notion that race should be used in such a strong
fashion, going so far as to equate race-conscious redistricting to a
form of apartheidP 9 Given that the Court's prohibition on racial
quotas would continue even if the principles of the government
funding cases were applied to government efforts to combat societal
discrimination, it is important to note that the Court's proscription on
racial quotas does not stem from the level of review the Court
applies, but is instead based on the Court's understanding of the
essential meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Racial quotas are
antithetical to the Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause because they exclude individuals based on their race, just as
making ordinary hiring decisions based on political affiliation is
antithetical to core First Amendment values.
This analysis may explain why the government funding cases
have not previously been applied to the contract set-aside cases
previously. On first blush, it might appear that the contract set-aside
cases-especially Croson and Adarand-should be treated as
government funding cases because they involve the government's use
of its funds on construction and other business projects. But because
the programs have generally been structured in a way that sought to
ensure that a fixed percentage of government dollars went to minority
contractors, or in the case of Metro Broadcasting by creating strong
preferences for broadcast licenses, these cases would run afoul of the
Court's spending power doctrine to the extent the programs set aside
federal dollars, or licenses, for African Americans.2 6  Explicitly
setting aside dollars based on race represents the kind of program
that conflicts with the Equal Protection Clause even where
government funding is at issue, because the government cannot award
contracts to a particular race simply based on its race.26'
to the employer, much like the situation in the Johnson case discussed earlier. See United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197-200 (1979).
259. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) ("A reapportionment plan that
includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise
widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in
common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance
to political apartheid.").
260. The set-aside program for the City of Richmond established a goal of awarding
thirty percent of city contracts to minority contractors, a goal the city was able to meet
when the program was in place. See DRAKE & HOLswORTH, supra note 125, at 82-83.
261. I should be clear that the Court perceives the set-aside cases as involving quotas, a
perception with which I disagree. As noted previously, the contract programs establish
goals rather than rigid quotas and those goals are rarely fully satisfied. At the same time,
tying the contract programs to the funding cases may provide an interesting challenge for
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Before moving to a discussion regarding the role these cases
might have on the Court's discrimination doctrine, I want to pause to
pursue the question of why cases such as Rust and Finley have not
previously been applied to the affirmative action cases.262 The most
likely reason, I believe, is that the Rust-Finley line of cases have
largely been regarded as the product of conservative causes and have
been treated as hostile to liberal causes such as remedying
discrimination.26 There is obviously some truth to this notion: both
Rosenberger and Rust were decided by five-member majorities that
broke down on traditional conservative/liberal lines, and Rust and
Finley were clearly aligned with conservative causes. It is equally
clear that the Court likely would have been unwilling to uphold the
government regulation at issue in Rust if the presumption underlying
the program had been reversed-if for example, the government was
only willing to allocate funds to health clinics that provided abortion
services. But, in light of the Court's decision in Rust, it would now be
difficult to distinguish programs that expressed different political
preferences, and it is a mistake to treat these cases as simply
implementing conservative political programs. Indeed, in the Court's
recent spate of rulings invalidating federal statutes applied to states
on sovereign immunity grounds, the Court has reaffirmed the power
of the federal government to require states to waive their sovereign
immunity through the spending power.2 4  Once the government
funding cases are shed of their conservative overtones, it is apparent
that the Court has turned over a broad area of discretion to
the Court. The two strongest proponents of the government's power to use its funds in a
largely unrestricted manner are Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, both of whom have yet to
identify a governmental condition that they did not find constitutionally permissible. Yet,
they are also the strongest opponents of the government's efforts to remedy racial
inequality, voting against all such programs that have come before them. Justice
Rehnquist was even the lone dissenter in the notorious Bob Jones case. See Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 612 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It is likely that
their antipathy for race-conscious measures would override their apparent sympathy for
governmental spending powers, but it would not be an easy opinion to write, and it is
certainly possible that so long as the government funds did not seek to institute racial
quotas, even these Justices would vote to affirm the government's power.
262. Among commentators, only Owen Fiss and Gerry Spann have noted a possible
connection, though neither discussion developed the argument. See OWEN M. FiSS, THE
IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 76 (1996) (suggesting that Metro Broadcasting was a product of
the Court's constitutional indifference to allocation decisions); Spann, supra note 92, at
85-86.
263. For one such treatment, see Heyman, supra note 198, at 1128.
264. See Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid'Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 686 (1999) (noting 'that Congress can require a waiver of sovereign immunity as a




governments to pursue their political objectives through the spending
power. These cases are best interpreted as affording judicial
deference to the political process, a deference that should extend to
efforts designed to remedy societal discrimination.
2. Reconfiguring the Set-Aside Provisions
In order for government set-aside programs to benefit from the
government funding cases, the programs would have to be
reconfigured to diminish their race consciousness. As noted earlier,
despite various provisions in the programs that allowed for waivers or
exemptions from the statutory requirements, the Supreme Court
typically has treated set-aside programs as involving racial quotas that
have not survived the Court's strict level of review 6 One way the
government might create a program that would satisfy the Court's
review under the spending power would be to reconfigure the
contract set-aside programs to reward employers for having a diverse
workforce, rather than by distributing funds based on the race of the
owners. Reconfigured in this way, the contract program might give a
preference to those employers who have a diverse workforce as
measured by current industry standards, or perhaps by relevant zip
codes to ensure that an employer is hiring based on the surrounding
community labor force. The preference could be in the form of a bid
credit so that a contractor who exceeded the industry standards would
be entitled to a credit worth up to ten or twenty percent of the
contract price, which would typically allow the contractor to underbid
its competitors. By providing such a preference, the government
would be choosing to deal with a business that takes racial justice
seriously, that has demonstrated a sincere commitment to the hiring
and advancement of minorities, and that has likewise shown a
commitment to eradicating the effects of societal discrimination.
A preference program premised on the diversity of the
workforce would differ significantly from most existing governmental
set-aside programs. Currently, most government programs provide
preferences to contractors based on the ownership of the company,
with the typical standard requiring that the company be at least fifty-
265. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
266. See Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781, 1809-11 (1996)
(discussing bid credits). Both of these measures are distinct from providing a preference
to the most diverse workforce of the bidders, which may seem to the Court as if the
government is preferring race rather than rewarding employers for having progressive
hiring policies.
2002] 1637
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
one percent owned by minority or disadvantaged individuals.2 67
These programs serve the dual purpose of overcoming discrimination
in the contracting industry, as well as encouraging entrepreneurship.
Shifting the focus away from ownership and onto the composition of
the workforce would serve slightly different goals of challenging the
effects of hiring discrimination and other discriminatory barriers that
have hindered entry into the contracting industry.
Changing the focus of the programs would also help address two
problems that have long plagued existing set-aside programs. When
the ownership of the business triggers the preference, it is not
uncommon for entities to affiliate with minorities in order to qualify
for a contract or a bid preference. 68 Those who have affiliated in
order to assist the company in qualifying for preference programs
were often well-known and wealthy individuals, frequently with little
actual interest in the underlying project 69 Within existing programs,
there are ways to protect against these difficulties, and the federal
transportation program has been altered so as to impose limits on the
net worth of the company that can qualify as a disadvantaged
business.2 7 Nonetheless, having the preference turn on the diversity
of the workforce will spread the benefits of the program more
broadly and avoid some of the concerns over whether the recipient is
truly deserving. 7' Emphasizing workforce diversity as opposed to the
nature of the ownership will also avoid concerns regarding the
existing statutory presumptions defining members of certain minority
groups as "disadvantaged" and therefore eligible for the program's
preferences.272
If the program were restructured in this way, it is difficult to
identify a legitimate constitutional objection. Although the program
could be described as race conscious insofar as government benefits
267. This is true of the existing federal contracting program operated under the
auspices of the Department of Transportation. See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (2000);
Participation by Disadvantaged Business Enterprises in Department of Transportation
Financial Assistance Programs, 49 C.F.R. § 26.69 (2001).
268. For a discussion of the problems that arise over sham corporations, see Ian Ayres
& Peter Cramton, Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the
FCC Increased Auction Competition, 48 STAN. L. REV. 761,807 & n.153 (1996).
269. Id. at 807.
270. See 49 C.F.R. § 26.67(b)(1) (2001) (stating that a net worth exceeding $750,000
defeats the presumption of economic disadvantage).
271. Debate obviously persists on whether those who receive preferences of all sorts
are truly deserving of them, and predicating the benefit on workforce diversity will not
necessarily resolve that debate.
272. See 49 C.F.R. § 26.67(a).
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would be tied to the presence of minorities in the workplace 2 73 it
would not involve a racial quota because it would not guarantee a
particular outcome. Similarly, as was true with other government
funding programs, this contract set-aside program would not require
particular action by the contractor.274 Instead the government would
be making a policy decision, supported by its funds, to choose to deal
with the most progressive employers in an industry, as measured by
the diversity of the workforce, and a firm would only need to take
action to the extent it wanted to participate in the federal program.
As a result, the program would largely be indistinguishable from a
program that refused to provide funds to abortion providers, or that
chose which artists to support based on the content of the art.275 If a
firm did not want to hire a diverse workforce, it would simply have to
forego federal funds in the same manner that clinics providing
abortions or artists creating indecent art have been required to do.
One notable difference, of course, is that employers or
contractors would be rewarded for the racial diversity of their hiring
practices, rather than rewarding doctors or artists for their social
choices. Race, however, would not be the exclusive requirement: any
employer or contractor could qualify for the program by rising above
industry averages in obtaining a diverse workforce. Assuming a
diverse workforce is a public good, as certainly has been the rhetoric
of both the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations,276 the
273. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 6, at 2333 (contending that ostensibly race-neutral
efforts can be described as race-conscious).
274. One way of understanding the Court's concern with what it treats as racial quotas
is that individuals or businesses are denied a reasonable opportunity to participate in the
process because of their race, a concern that underlies the Court's treatment of traditional
affirmative action plans and the more recent racial redistricting cases where the Court is
clearly troubled by the fact that the districts are drawn to produce a particular result and
generally succeed in doing so. See Selmi, supra note 110, at 317.
275. See, e.g., Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
("The choice is up to the State: either give up federal aid to education, or agree that the
Department of Education can be sued under Section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act]."),
cert. denied, 533 U.S. 949 (2001); Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 552 (4th
Cir. 1999) (requiring a state university to comply with Title IX regulations because
"Spending Clause legislation, in contrast to other Article I legislation ... presents a state
with a choice: the state can either comply with certain congressionally mandated
conditions in exchange for federal funds or not comply and decline the funds"), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1181 (2000).
276. See Gary L. Gregg, II, Toward A Representational Framework for Presidency
Studies, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 297, 302 (1999) (noting that President Clinton's
commitment to diversity needs to be considered in evaluating his efforts at political
representation); Peter Baker, President Completes Second-Term Team, WASH. PosT, Dec.
21, 1996, at Al (quoting President Clinton as saying, "I believe that one of my jobs at this
moment in history is to demonstrate by the team I put together that no group of people
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government should be free to reward those entities that succeed in
their pursuit of a common, and legitimate, social goal. The message
embodied in such a program would be that the government wants to
do business not just with nondiscriminatory employers, which the law
already requires, but with progressive employers, a message the
government should be free to pursue through its spending powers.277
Indeed, from this perspective, the program might be seen as involving
government speech, where the government has perhaps the broadest
authority to pursue its particular policy choices. As noted above, the
Supreme Court has suggested that the government is to be held
accountable to the electorate for its own speech and advocacy,278 and
here the government's message would be a desire to remedy
discrimination broadly defined and to enlist the aid of businesses in
that mission, regardless of the owners' race, ethnicity, or political
affiliation.
For the program to be upheld, the government would have to
establish a reasonable parameter for determining when a contract
bonus or preference would be awarded, as well as an explanation for
why the funding condition was legitimate and related to the
underlying program to which it was attached.2 79 On the first element,
the government might reward contractors that exceed industry
averages by twenty-five percent or some other pertinent benchmark,
or the government might choose to deal with the contractor that has
established the best hiring practices within the particular industry, as
long as its bid fell within an acceptable range. Along these lines, the
government could establish a system, similar to the civil service
programs that governs much government hiring where an agency is
able to hire any of the top three candidates-what is colloquially
should be excluded from service to our country and that all people are capable of serving.
So I have striven to achieve both excellence and diversity"); Ellen Nakashima & Al
Kamen, Bush Official Hails Diversity, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 31,2001, § 1, at 10 (comparing the
Bush Administration's record on diversity to the Clinton Administration).
277. As discussed shortly, the government already seeks to pursue such a mission
through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Executive Order 11246, both of
which impose certain affirmative obligations on the recipient of federal funds, including
federal contractors. See infra Part III.B.
278. See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) ("When the
government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular
idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its
advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some
different or contrary position.").
279. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,211 (1987) (upholding Congress's indirect
encouragement of state action to raise the minimum drinking age).
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known as the rule of three s0 Under this concept, the government
would choose the firm with the best hiring record among the top
three to five bidders. To the extent that all of the contractors have
equal records, no one would be entitled to a contracting preference.Ml
As noted above, to fall within the spending power cases, it would
also be necessary to establish that the funding condition is related to
the underlying program, a relatively undemanding requirement.
Here, the analysis would return to a focus on societal discrimination;
the government would argue that it wants to reward those employers
who are working to combat societal discrimination by ensuring
opportunity for minority employees, and it might also be necessary or
desirable to document that societal discrimination had influenced the
particular industry in which the funds are being distributed. Within
this framework, the contractor need not admit or establish its own
past discrimination as a prerequisite to taking affirmative action, nor
would the government be obligated to document its role in
perpetuating discriminatory patterns within the particular industry.
Rather, the government would be using its funds to attack a known
problem, and drawing on private businesses to assist in the quest to
overcome the effects of societal discrimination, both past and present.
This kind of a program would be akin to existing unobjectionable
governmental programs that provide awards to employers for their
hiring practices, 213 except that the awards would now be monetary in
nature, functionally equivalent to a subsidy.
Finding that the programs are related to remedying societal
discrimination would also alleviate any concern that the government's
280. See Lackhouse v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 773 F.2d 313, 315 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(identifying the federal government's promotion rule as "the rule of three").
281. One caveat should be noted. It is conceivable that an entire industry might be so
rife with discrimination that even the best entity within the industry might be one that still
was acting unlawfully. Under these circumstances, no one should be entitled to a
contracting preference, and indeed, the contractors would be in violation of their
nondiscriminatory obligations under existing statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) (Title
VI).
282. The requirement that the funding condition be related to the underlying program
has generally been easily satisfied. See Engdahl, supra note 155, at 62 ("[I]t remains true
... that the Supreme Court has never actually held any spending condition
unconstitutional for lack of germaneness.").
283. The Department of Labor provides an annual award to a federal contractor that
has "established and instituted comprehensive workforce strategies to ensure equal
employment opportunity," a program that was initiated in 1988 under a Republican
administration. See Department of Labor Division of Management and Administrative
Programs, Employment Standards Administration Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs Directive No. 248, at http:lwww.dol.gov/dollesalpubliclmedialreports/
ofccp/evedir.htm (last visited Feb- 12, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
2002] 1641
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
spending power might be used to serve contrary purposes. No
legitimate rationale exists for a government to reward employers who
have an all-white, or nondiverse, workforce, such that a program
designed to reward a nondiverse workforce should be invalidated
even under a rationality review.m Consistent with the purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the government's spending power, as
related to societal discrimination, would work only in one direction,
and while the programs could be abolished by a different
government, they could not be used to pursue illegitimate purposes.
This proposition highlights an important potential downside to
justifying contracting programs based on the spending power: a
different, more conservative, government might prefer contractors
that do not have affirmative action plans. While there would be no
legitimate purpose in preferring a contractor that did not have a
diverse workforce, it is quite possible that a government might prefer
to do business with contractors that did not engage in any form of
affirmative action. Such a program would likely be constitutional,
which may suggest that using the government spending power to
remedy societal discrimination may include some political risks. But
these are the risks that are attendant to politics and more than
anything else might direct lobbying efforts to the political branches,
where at least on the federal level, efforts to prevent the repeal of
existing affirmative action programs have been quite successful.25
Similarly, allowing politically progressive governments to use their
spending power to enhance minority opportunities will very probably
offer more fertile conditions for racial justice than the existing regime
284. One possible complication could arise. Richard Epstein has argued that
employers might rationally want a homogenous workforce for purposes of either customer
preference or worker solidarity. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE
CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 59-79 (1992). Conceivably, these
motives might be treated as rational under the Equal Protection Clause, but because they
are premised on a dislike of a particular group, it seems more likely that they would be
invalidated as irrational. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (invalidating a
Colorado constitutional amendment prohibiting protection for gays and lesbians under
rationality review).
285. Even in what would appear a quite receptive climate, over the last five years
Congress has repeatedly refused to legislatively invalidate any existing affirmative action
program, and the entrenchment of existing programs may offer some protection from a
widespread scale back. See James Dao, Senate Stops Bid to End Road-Work Set-Asides,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1998, at A9 ("In this year's first major test of Federal affirmative
action policies, the Senate strongly rejected an effort today to end a two-decade old
program."); Jeffrey Rosen, Damage Control, NEW YORKER, Feb. 23, 1998, at 58, 60-62




where most current efforts are devoted to fighting to preserve the
status quo rather than stretching its boundaries. 26
Even a reconfigured set-aside program would undoubtedly be
subject to constitutional challenges. However, the Equal Protection
Clause would not stand as a barrier unless the party challenging the
program could establish that the successful contractor was only able
to achieve a diverse workforce through unconstitutional means. In
some ways this may sound circular: only an unconstitutional program
would violate the Equal Protection clause. But what I mean to
suggest is that the focus of the inquiry would be on the hiring
practices of the contractor, rather than the funding requirements of
the program. If the contractor can demonstrate that it used lawful
means to achieve a diverse workforce, there would be no argument
that the program encouraged or required unconstitutional conduct.8
It would certainly be wrong to presume that a diverse workforce was
the product of unconstitutional actions, or even a product of
affirmative action at all.8
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has arguably reached
a contrary conclusion in striking down, on two recent occasions, a
preference program administered by the FCC.2 9 The initial case
involved a challenge to the program by a church that operated a
classical music radio station that arose after the FCC determined that
the church had failed to comply with the Commission's affirmative
action regulations because the church preferred to hire individuals
with religious knowledge to work at its radio station, a practice that in
this instance had a disparate effect on minorities.29° The court
invalidated the government's regulations arguing that "[t]he
regulations pressure stations to maintain a workforce that mirrors the
racial breakdown of their 'metropolitan statistical area' " and "[a]s
such, they can and surely will result in individuals being granted a
286. In an engaging book, Mark Tushnet has recently argued that we ought to take the
Constitution away from the courts and place it more solidly in the political realm. See
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
287. Restructuring the program to focus on the diversity of the workforce might also
render the challenges more limited, focusing on the particular recipient of the funds rather
than on the program itself, assuming there are constitutional means for achieving a diverse
workforce. Thus, if a challenge were successful, it should result in voiding only a
particular contract, rather than the program itself.
288. For a lengthy discussion of various forms of affirmative action and how their
structure determines their constitutionality, see Shuford v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 897 F.
Supp. 1535, 1551-56 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
289. See MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v. FCC, 236 F.3d 13, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344,356 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
290. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 141 F.3d at 346-48.
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preference because of their race.291 Such a preference, the court held,
was facially unconstitutional.
The court premised its conclusion, however, on the erroneous
notion that a diverse workforce is inevitably the product of
unconstitutional preferences, rather than an aggressive recruitment
drive or other practices that tend to draw in minority employees in
one way or another-whether by transportation subsidies or by
charitable giving to minority communities.2 2 It is indeed unfortunate
when an appellate court presumes that a diverse workforce can only
be obtained unconstitutionally, and contrarily, that an all-white
workforce is to be treated as a natural byproduct of legitimate
hiring.293
Yet, even a court inclined to follow the D.C. Circuit's reasoning
need not invalidate the reconfigured contract set-aside program
described above. The program administered by the FCC did not
involve the government's spending power, but was instead an exercise
in regulatory power, a power, as noted earlier, that involves an
important limited resource that the Court has endeavored to see is
broadly distributed.294 Moreover, the FCC's program was premised
on the rationale of promoting diversity in programming, a rationale
that had earlier generated so much controversy in the Supreme
Court's decision in Metro Broadcasting.295 Accordingly, even if the
case is seen as well-grounded, it should not affect the analysis under
the spending power.
291. Id. at 352-54. More recently, the D.C. Circuit invalidated one option (option B)
broadcast stations had to satisfy the FCC's regulations, an option that required affirmative
recruitment efforts. See MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, 236 F.3d at 21 ("Option B places
pressure upon each broadcaster to recruit minorities without a predicate finding that the
particular broadcaster discriminated in the past or reasonably could be expected to do so
in the future.").
292. The court's decision in Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod produced a stinging
dissent from Chief Judge Edwards on the court's decision not to grant en banc review. He
specifically contested the court's determination to apply strict scrutiny to the FCC
program, noting:
The regulations in no way draw any kind of racial classification. They plainly do
not "oblige" anyone to exercise any sort of hiring preference. Rather, the
regulations merely facilitate the avoidance of unlawful employment
discrimination. The regulations "influence" hiring decisions only in the sense
that anti-discrimination law generally seeks to influence employers to avoid bias.
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 154 F.3d at 496-97 (Edwards, CJ., dissenting from the
denial for suggestions of rehearing en banc).
293. For an analysis of the case, see Adams, supra note 143, at 1426-35.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
295. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 141 F.3d at 354-55; MD/DC/DE




There remains a question of whether these reconfigured
programs would be consistent with the Court's existing Equal
Protection doctrine, and, if so, whether applying the government
funding cases significantly advances the constitutional argument. It
has recently been argued that the Supreme Court should uphold,
under existing doctrine, those programs that are racially motivated in
the pursuit of permissible governmental objectives,29 6 and it is
conceivable that the Supreme Court would uphold the restructured
set-aside program even without the aid of the government funding
cases. But it seems equally likely that the Court would apply strict
scrutiny to the programs, treating them as both race conscious and in
pursuit of an impermissible goal. Bringing the government funding
cases into the analysis would demonstrate that the programs at issue
are political programs legitimately structured to further the
government's discretion to choose among competing policy goals.
The government funding cases, therefore, add an important
perspective to the issue and, if applied properly, would offer a more
stable constitutional ground on which the programs could rest.
B. Other Means of Remedying Societal Discrimination
Turning to the spending power as an analytical method will likely
have its greatest impact in the area of contract set-asides,197 but there
are other ways in which the government might use its funds to combat
societal discrimination. In fact, the argument set forth above relating
to contract set-aside programs could readily be extended to other
areas in which the federal government uses its spending power. The
argument developed in this Article, for example, might be applied to
universities so that the government would provide additional funds to
those that have especially diverse student populations, as measured
by competing universities or the relevant pool of applicants. In this
section, I discuss two additional possibilities, one involving an existing
governmental program and some additional programs that might be
created with the purpose of eradicating societal discrimination.
1. Title VI, the Disparate Impact Theory, and the Spending Clause
Title VI, passed as part of the omnibus Civil Rights Act of 1964,
is one of the least known and least enforced of the civil rights statutes,
296. See, e.g., Forde-Mazrui, supra note 6, at 2382 (arguing that efforts to remedy racial
discrimination and promote diversity are neither racially discriminatory nor suspect, and
therefore should not be subject to strict scrutiny).
297. As noted earlier, see supra notes 5-6, the inability of the government to remedy
societal discrimination has led to the invalidation of dozens of set-aside programs.
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though potentially one of the most potent.29 s In the last few years the
statute has experienced a surprising renewal of interest primarily as a
result of private enforcement actions based on varied and creative
litigation strategies.2 99 As litigation under Title VI has increased, the
statute's scope has faced a number of challenges; in particular,
questions have been raised regarding whether the statute includes a
disparate impact component.30
The spending power cases provide the best means by which the
statute can be construed to reach practices that have disparate effects
upon racial minorities, which could potentially have a far-reaching
impact on the recipients of federal funds. For example, if Title VI
encompasses neutral practices that have disparate racial effects, many
Universities and colleges may have to reconsider their admissions
programs, especially their emphasis on standardized tests as a
criterion for admission given that the tests have been demonstrated to
have a significant disparate impact in many settings. 1
Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race and national
origin by the recipients of federal funds."° Since its passage there has
been a substantial question whether the statute requires the recipients
of federal funds to remedy their practices that have disparate racial
298. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). For an excellent analysis of the government's limited
enforcement efforts under Title VI, see STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITs OF THE
LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS Acr 304-19 (1995).
299. Title VI litigation currently represents some of the most interesting challenges
being litigated in federal courts today. See, e.g., Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107, 109 (3d
Cir. 1999) (challenging athletic eligibility requirements); Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484,
487 (11th Cir. 1999)) (challenging a state policy of providing drivers' examinations only in
English), rev'd sub nom, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,279 (2001); Ferguson v. City
of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469 (4th Cir. 1999) (challenging a city policy of arresting or
sending to drug counseling pregnant women who test positive for cocaine), rev'd, 532 U.S.
67, 70 (2001); Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1183 (11th Cir. 1999)
(challenging a city's failure to annex a housing project); N.Y. Urban League v. New York,
71 F.3d 1031, 1033 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (challenging an increase in subway fare as
disproportionately excluding minorities from the transit system).
300. See, e.g., Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 400 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that Title VI
permits a private right of action to pursue a disparate impact claim). The Supreme Court
recently held that Title VI does not permit private parties to bring disparate impact
challenges, though the Court did not address the question of whether the federal
government can do so. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 280-81.
301. For a discussion regarding the disparate impact of the Law School Admissions
Test, see Linda F. Wrightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical
Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admissions
Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (1997).
302. Title VI reads: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
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effects but are not otherwise intentionally discriminatory. The
Supreme Court has addressed the issue in a curious and confused
manner, holding that while Title VI only prohibits intentional
discrimination, the agency regulations implementing the statute can
permissibly forbid discrimination based on the disparate effects of the
federal contractor's practices.30 3 Federal regulations have for many
years interpreted the statute to include a disparate impact
component,3°- and a large number of the cases currently being filed
under Title VI have involved disparate impact challenges.3 0 5  As
noted previously, disparate impact challenges are intended primarily
to address societal discrimination, so to the extent the government
can require its contractors to remedy practices that have a disparate
impact on racial minorities, it is effectively requiring those contractors
to remedy societal discrimination.
Although the existing regulations have always seemed a bit
incongruous, given their apparent inconsistency with the statutory
303. The Supreme Court has addressed the scope of Title VI on five occasions.
Initially, in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974), the Court held that Title VI
encompassed a disparate impact theory, although this holding was later thrown into doubt
when the Court construed Title VI to be coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment,
which does not reach disparate impact claims. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 328 (opinion of Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). Several years later the Court arrived at a particularly
tortured approach best summarized by Justice Powell:
Only Justices White and Marshall believe that a violation of Title VI may be
established by proof of discriminatory effect, and Justice White would recognize
only noncompensatory prospective relief for such a violation. Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stevens, however, believe that a violation of the regulations
adopted pursuant to Title VI may be established by proof of discriminatory
impact. Thus, a majority of the Court would hold that proof of discriminatory
effect suffices to establish liability only when the suit is brought to enforce the
regulations rather than the statute itself.
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. 'Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 608 n.1 (1983) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted). Two years later, the Court affirmed this reading by
permitting a disparate impact challenge based on implementing regulations. See
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985) ("[A]ctions having an unjustifiable
disparate impact on minorities could be reddressed through agency regulations designed
to implement the purposes of Title VI."). Last term, the Court held that private parties
could not pursue disparate impact claims under Title VI. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275,279 (2001).
304. See, e.g., Nondiscrimination Under Programs Receiving Financial Assistance
Through the Department of Education Effectuation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2001) (prohibiting fund recipients from "utiliz[ing] criteria
or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to
discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin").
305. See cases cited supra notes 299-300 (involving disparate impact challenges). In
light of the Court's recent determination that private parties cannot bring disparate impact
challenges under Title VI, the onus will fall on the government to pursue these claims.
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mandate, the spending clause may help explain why the regulations
have generally been treated as presumptively valid even by the
Supreme Court itself.3°6 When the spending power is introduced into
the analysis, it becomes clear that the government can interpret the
statutory obligations of Title VI broadly so as to ensure the recipients
of federal aid seek to remedy discrimination defined expansively as a
means of addressing the national problem of societal discrimination.
In this respect, the Title VI regulations closely resemble the
regulations upheld in Rust v. Sullivan. °7 Just as the government did
not want to expend funds in a way that might have supported or
encouraged abortions, the government is here ensuring that its funds
are not used in a manner that supports discrimination of any kind. As
was true in the funding cases more generally, if a potential fund
recipient refused to alleviate the adverse effect of its practices, it
would be free to refuse the federal funds-just as the health clinics
were free to turn away federal funds if they wanted to provide
abortion counseling, or just as states could decline highway funds if
they thought a national speed limit would unreasonably slow their
drivers down. °8
The government might even go further by requiring federal
contractors to address the disparate impact of their practices as a
condition of receiving funds, so that a contractor would have to
demonstrate that its relevant hiring practices did not have a disparate
impact on racial minorities before it received federal funds.309 This
would mark a substantial change from the existing programs where
contractors' practices can be challenged only after the funding is
provided and would help ensure broad remedial efforts were taken as
a condition for receiving federal funds.
The only restriction on the government's ability to construe Title
VI to apply to practices that had an adverse impact would be the
particular language of the statute. But given that the Supreme Court
has interpreted nearly identical language under Title VII-passed at
the same time as Title VI-to include a disparate impact cause of
action, the government's administrative interpretation of Title VI
306. See Choate, 469 U.S. at 299.
307. 500 U.S. 173, 177 (1991). As noted earlier, the regulations at issue in Rust were
promulgated under the Reagan Administration and were subsequently rescinded by the
Clinton Administration, suggesting that an administration has broad discretion to pursue
its own policy objectives so long as the interpretation is reasonable.
308. See supra notes 202-12 (discussing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)).
309. I am grateful to Ian Ayres for this suggestion.
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should be deemed a reasonable one.310  Accordingly, the spending
clause provides the underlying explanation for the government's
power to require its contractors to remedy societal discrimination in
the form of disparate impact claims, or by taking the positive step of
requiring contractors to remedy their practices that have a disparate
effect as a condition of receiving federal funds.
2. Funding Integration Efforts
A final area where the government could use its spending power
to help eradicate societal discrimination would be by funding various
integration efforts. These efforts could take many forms; for
example, the government might provide additional housing funds to
developments that are built in integrated areas, or that help maintain
or increase housing integration. Existing cases suggest that
government efforts to encourage affirmative outreach or recruitment
designed to foster housing integration would likely be upheld so long
as the developments did not achieve integration through
impermissible racial quotas or resident balances.3 ' Indeed, the
government currently requires the recipients of federal housing funds
to comply with federal housing requirements, which include creating
an affirmative marketing program designed to attract minority
applicants.312 The First Circuit Court of Appeals recently rejected a
challenge to the program, although the court did not rely on the
government's spending power to sustain the program.313 Under the
government's spending power, these programs should clearly be
upheld both as a valid means to pursue the legitimate goal of housing
integration, and demonstrate further that the government already
takes various actions designed to remedy societal discrimination.
The government might also choose to provide funds to civil
rights groups to enable them to pursue integration strategies,
310. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971) (interpreting Title VII to
include disparate impact claims).
311. Compare United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1103 (2d Cir. 1988)
(invalidating a racial balance program designed to preserve an integrated housing
complex), with S.-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d
868, 871 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding race-conscious marketing designed to maintain racially
integrated neighborhoods). For a discussion of the constitutionality of mortgage-incentive
programs intended to foster integration, see Suja A. Thomas, Efforts to Integrate Housing:
The Legality of Mortgage-Incentive Programs, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 940 (1991).
312. See Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development-Effectuation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,24 C.F.R. §§ 1.5,5.105,200.620 (2001).
313. See Raso v. Lago, 135 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 1998) (upholding a marketing program
that was a condition of receiving federal housing funds).
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including suing discriminatory employers or housing providers.
Although the government frequently works on discrimination cases in
conjunction with civil rights groups, it has never provided direct
funding to these groups, and this practice might offer another means
to address societal discrimination.
Integration, to be sure, is not as fashionable a concept today as it
once was,314 but its unfashionable nature should not define its
constitutional permissibility. I also believe the idea of integration is
not nearly as unfashionable as it may seem;315 rather, calls for
integration today come in a different form under the label of
diversity. A diverse student body, which is now generally the calling
cry behind affirmative action in higher education,316 necessarily
implies an integrated student body, at least at some level. Relatedly,
integration has fallen out of favor largely from the current realization
that meaningful integration-either in schools or in housing-now
seems out of reach for much of the country, which has understandably
produced a good deal of frustration and resentment among civil rights
advocates.1 7 One important difference worth highlighting between
current calls for diversity and past calls for integration is that the
latter were often, though not inevitably, based on an assumption of
assimilation,31 8 whereas today's call for diversity implies preserving
different cultures in a mixed culture environment.
314. For a sampling of the extensive critical commentary, see LEONARD STEINHORN &
BARBARA DIGGs-BROWN, BY THE COLOR OF OUR SKIN: THE ILLUSION OF
INTEGRATION AND THE REALITY OF RACE (1999); Wendy R. Brown, The Convergence
of Neutrality and Choice: The Limits of the State's Affirmative Duty to Provide Equal
Educational Opportunity, 60 TENN. L. REV. 63 (1992); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist,
Tonk, and United States v. Fordice: Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81
CAL. L. REV. 1401 (1993); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758.
315. See, e.g., John A. Powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing and Education,
80 MINN. L. REV. 749,791-93 (1996) (advocating an integrationist strategy).
316. See Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Kytal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV.
1745, 1773-77 (1996) (emphasizing the importance of including students of diverse
backgrounds in higher education); Sumi K. Cho, Multiple Consciousness and the Diversity
Dilemma, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 1035, 1036-37 (1997) (arguing in favor of diversity as an
affirmative action justification); Stephanie M. Wildman, Integration in the 1980s. The
Dream of Diversity and the Cycle of Exclusion, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1625, 1674-76 (1990)
(articulating diversity justification).
317. See Powell, supra note 315, at 785-88 (discussing opposition to integration among
current civil rights advocates). For a measured discussion of a limited separation strategy,
see BROOKS, supra note 133, at 189-97.
318. See Johnson, supra note 314, at 1469 ("The brand of integration ... practiced in
America merely requires assimilation of African Americans into white culture and does




Regardless of whether integration is deemed fashionable, the
government is certainly free to pursue integration as a social and
political strategy, and at least for the near future, it is highly likely
that the government will continue to treat integration as the ultimate
ideal. Moreover, as was true with the set-aside programs,319 there can
be no argument that a program designed to further integration would
later be replaced by a program aimed at increasing segregation. An
integration mandate is plainly consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment, if not necessarily mandated by its terms, whereas no
contemporary government could conceive of an argument that
segregation was legitimately consistent with our constitutional
dictates, and it also seems safe to suggest that no government would
even try.
CONCLUSION
Government spending can be wielded as an important tool in the
effort to eradicate societal discrimination, and if used in the manner
described in this Article, may save many existing, and future,
programs from judicial invalidation. In this Article, I have
demonstrated that the Court's persistent holding that it is
impermissible for the government to take affirmative measures to
remedy societal discrimination is mistaken. Pursuant to the
government's spending power, the government can, and does, take
efforts to eradicate the social evil that is often labeled as societal
discrimination, just as it can promote decent art or take efforts to
encourage women to forego abortions. With respect to its efforts to
remedy societal discrimination, the government can reward its
government contractors who engage in affirmative action, those
contractors that have diverse workforces that exceed industry
averages, and even require its contractors to remedy societal
discrimination by interpreting its nondiscrimination mandates to
include a disparate impact component. I do not mean to suggest that
the Supreme Court would uphold all of these efforts, but the
government funding cases may provide an important new analytical
element to what has otherwise become a tired and losing struggle.
Moreover, by focusing on the role societal discrimination has played
in the Court's doctrine, it should be clear that the government has a
duty to seek its eradication, not just because of the harm it entails, but
because of the government's role in creating and perpetuating
319. See supra text accompanying notes 260-61.
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societal discrimination. Turning to the spending power may just
move that cause forward.
